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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the Supreme Court issued its first decision concerning the patentability
of mathematical algorithms and, indirectly, computer programs.' More than twentyfive years later, courts are still struggling to understand when computer-related
inventions and mathematical algorithm-related inventions can be patented.'
The perplexing issue has been whether such inventions are patentable subject
matter.' Section 101 of the Patent Act lists four kinds of things as being patentable
subject matter: (1) processes; (2) machines; (3) manufactures; and (4) compositions
of matter.4
While this list looks straightforward, it is anything but that. First, the Supreme
Court has stated that some things are not patentable subject matter.' These include
natural phenomenon, laws of nature, abstract ideas, and mathematical algorithms.6

1. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); see also cases
cited infra note 71.
3. Throughout this paper, the word "patents" is used as a shorthand for "utility patents." Plant patents and
design patents are outside the scope of this article.
4. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). This language has been the same since the first patent statute
was enacted in 1790 except that, prior to 1952, patent statutes used the word "art" instead of "process." The change
to the word "process," however, did not change the meaning.
5. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
6. In Benson, the Supreme Court wrote:
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Second, the list should not be read literally. For example, paperback mystery
novels, compact discs (CDs) containing musical recordings, and copies of paintings
are copyrightable subject matter, not patentable subject matter, notwithstanding the
fact that a paperback book with the novel, a CD with the music, and a copy of a
painting are each an article of "manufacture." 7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
held that a "process" for converting binary coded decimal numerals into pure binary
numerals was not patentable subject matter, i.e., that this process is not the kind of
"process" that is listed in § 101.
Third, the Federal Circuit, which is the appellate court with exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals of cases involving patent infringement and patent validity, is internally
divided when it comes to interpreting § 101 in cases involving computer-related
inventions and mathematical algorithm-related inventions.9
Now, more than twenty-five years after the Supreme Court first addressed the
issue, we can say with some confidence that courts have no coherent methodology
for deciding whether computer-related and mathematical algorithm-related
inventions are patentable subject matter. Looking at the words of the statute has not
been adequate. The three Supreme Court decisions and decades of decisions by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), t° succeeded by the Federal
Circuit, have not sufficed. What is needed is a fresh look at the issue and a new
perspective. "

"A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot
be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right." Phenomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable,
as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)).
7. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02[4] (1998) ("Printed matter alone and by itself
does not constitute a 'manufacture."'). Note that the physical media in these cases (blank books, blank CDs, and
blank canvases) would be patentable subject matter, but would fail to be patentable on other grounds such as lack
of novelty.
8. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 63, 71-72 (1972).
9. See discussion infra Parts m-Iv.
10. In 1982, the C.C.P.A. was abolished and the newly created Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
given jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
11. There is a rich literature dealing with the issues raised in this article, although virtually none has
grounded the analysis on the Patent Clause of the Constitution. Some of the more recent works are the following:
D.C. TOEDT, Software Patents, in LAW AND BUsINEss OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE § 6 (1996); Maria T. Arriola, In
Re Alappat and Beyond: A New Approach to the Patentability of Mathematical Algorithms and Computer
Programs in the United States?, 5 FED. CIRcUrr BJ. 293 (1995); Ruben Bains, Note, A Comparison of the PTO's
Computer-Implemented Guidelines with the Current Case Law, 5 TrEX.bTEL PROP. LJ.27 (1996); David L
Bohan, Note, Computer Programs: Abstract Ideas or Patentable Subject Matter?, 29 SUFFOLK U. L REV. 809
(1995); John A. Burtis, Comment, Towards a Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-Related Patentability in Light
of In Re Alappat, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1129 (1995); Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software
Instruction as an "Article of Manufacture": Software as Such as the Right Stuff 17 J. MARSHAiL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 89 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL L REV. 1091 (1995); Jeffrey S. Draeger, Comment,
Are Beauregard's Claims Really Valid?, 17 J. MARSHAU J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 277 (1998); Nellie A. Fisher,
Comment, The Patent Eligibility of Computer Implemented Processes in the Wake of In Re Alappat' The Diehr
Standard Resurrected, 32 HOUS. L REv. 517 (1995); John A. Gibby, Software Patent Developments: A
Programmer's Perspective, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ.293 (1997); James R. Goodman et al., Toward
a Fact-Based Standard for Determining Whether Programmed Computers are Patentable Subject Matter: The
Scientific Wisdom of Alappat and Ignorance of Trovato, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 353 (1995); Lee A.
Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need for Congressional Action on Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 283
(1996); Mary S. Kakefuda, Note, Patent Law-Determining when a Process Invention Contains a Mathematical
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This article reviews the cases and the analysis relating to patentability of
mathematical algorithm-related inventions and computer-related inventions and
suggests a new approach to these issues. The proposed approach indicates that the
Constitution provides guidance when deciding whether something is patentable
subject matter.
The Constitution advises us that the purpose of patent law is to "promote the
progress of the useful Arts" and Congress is authorized to enact legislation to grant
patents only for "discoveries."' 2 Among other things, this means that one cannot
patent an abstract idea, a natural phenomenon, or a law of nature. 3 Even though
these may be useful, they are not the kind of "discoveries" referred to in the
Constitution. The constitutional requirements also mean that patents can only issue
on inventions that involve applications to some practical end. In addition, the
Constitution indicates that patents can only issue on inventions which have practical
utility within the "technological arts."' 4 This limitation indicates that patents should
not issue for material which is primarily within the subject matter of copyrights.
These and other constitutional limitations on patentable subject matter are discussed
in this article in order to develop a new methodology for evaluating whether a
patent claim involving mathematical algorithms or computer programs is patentable

subject matter.
In part II, this article reviews the relevant Supreme Court decisions. Part III
describes some of the tests developed and used by the C.C.P.A. and the Federal
Circuit to analyze the subject matter issue. It shows that different Federal Circuit
judges apply these tests to reach conflicting results, indicating that the tests cannot
be applied in a coherent and consistent manner. Part IV analyzes a recent district
court decision and its reversal by the Federal Circuit, confirming the inadequacy of

Algorithm and when It Falls within StatutorySubject Matter, In Re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994), 68
TEMPLE L REv. 507 (1995); Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyrightin the Protection of
ComputerPrograms, 17 J. MARSHALL J.ComrER & INIO. L 41 (1998); Sang Hui Michael Kim, In Re Alappat.
A Strict Statutory InterpretationDeterminingPatentable Subject MatterRelating to Computer Software?, 13 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L 635 (1995); Ronald S. Laurie & Joseph K. Siino, A Bridge Over Troubled
Waters? Software Patentabilityand the PTO'sProposed Guidelines(PartI), COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1995, at 6;
Nancy J. Linckand & Karen A. Buchanan, Patent Protectionfor Computer-Related Inventions, 18 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. lJ.659 (1996); John E. McGlynn, Note, PatentLaw-PatentableSubject Matter and Computer
Software Inventions-InRe Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed Cir. 1994). 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L & TECH. J. 135 (1995);
Maximilian R. Peterson, Note, Now You See It, Now You Don't: Was It a PatentableMachine or an Unpatentable
"Algorithm"? On Principleand Erpediency in CurrentPatent Law DoctrinesRelating to Computer-Implemented
Inventions,64 GEO. WASH. L REv. 90 (1995); Richard H. Stem, Solving the Algorithm Conundrum:After 1994
in the FederalCircuit PatentLaw Needs a RadicalAlgorithmectomy, 22 AIPLA QJ. 167 (1994); Richard H. Stem,
An Attempt to Rationalize FloppyDisc Claims, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L 183 (1998) [hereinafter
Stem, An Attempt to Rationalize]; D.C. Toedt, Software as "Machine DNA": Argumentsfor Patenting Useful
ComputerDisks PerSe. 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 275 (1995); Edward A. Uhl, Note, Sent Back to the
Futureof Software Patents,In Re Trovato, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed Cir. 1995), 21 U. DAYTON L REv. 757 (1996); Brian
Richard Yoshida, ClaimingElectronic and Software Technologies: The Effect of the FederalCircuitDecisions
in Alappat Wannerdam, and Lowry on the Claiming of MathematicalAlgorithms and DataStructures, 45 BUFF.
L.REv. 457 (1997).
12. U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl. 8.
13. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions. Part V discusses the Guidelines
issued by the Patent and Trademark Office. 5
Part VI of this article identifies some untenable statements which courts have
made, and then develops a new approach to the issue of patentability that focuses
on the Constitution. This alternative focus identifies constitutional constraints on
the patent system which have implications for the statutory standards of
nonobviousness, usefulness, novelty, and statutory subject matter. The constitutional limitations on patentable subject matter is explored in depth in various
subsections of part VI.
II. GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has issued three decisions concerning the patentability of
mathematical algorithm-related inventions and computer-related inventions."6 As
we shall see, however, these decisions have not provided clear guidance.
The first case was Gottschalk v. Benson." The patent application in this case was
for a method of converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary
numerals (i.e., it converted one way of writing a number into another way of writing
the same number)."8 The application described the invention as being related "to the
processing of data by program and more particularly to the programmed conversion
of numerical information."' 9
The Court framed the issue as "whether the method described and claimed is a
'process' within the meaning of the Patent Act," ° and answered by saying that the
claim was not patentable subject matter because the claim was so broad as to be an
attempt to patent an idea:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would
be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary
numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula involved here
has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital
computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself.2'
The Court's analysis was built on a dichotomy between unpatentable subject
matter and patentable subject matter. The Court noted that "[p]henomena of nature,
... mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."2 2 While these things are
not patentable, "the application of the law of nature [to achieve] a new and useful

15. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
16. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk'v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
17. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
18. For example, the number we normally write as 125 can be written in binary coded decimal as 0001 0010
0101. It can be written in pure binary as 1111101.
19. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
20. Id.
21. Id. at71-72.
22. Id. at 67.
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end"" or "a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth" can be patentable.'
Benson teaches a number of principles. One is that abstract ideas are not
patentable; it is the application of those ideas to achieve a new and useful result
which can be patented. Another is that basic tools of science and technology, such
as laws of nature and their mathematical expression, are not patentable.
A third principle is that overly broad patent claims cannot be maintained. For
example, the Court referred to a case involving Samuel Morse, who was allowed a
number of claims relating to telegraphy, but whose eighth claim was denied.2 5 That
claim was exceptionally broad:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of machinery,
described in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of my
invention being, the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current,
which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances.26
The Benson Court quoted the reasoning for disallowing this claim:
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the
result is accomplished. For aught that we now know, some future inventor, in
the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current without using any part of
the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification. His
invention may be less complicated-less liable to get out of order-less
expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet, if it is covered by this
patent, the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it, without
the permission of this patentee.27
As explained in the Telephone Cases, Morse's eighth claim was so broad as to be
a claim for "the use of magnetism as a motive power, without regard to the
particular process with which it was connected in the patent," which was not
allowable.28
A fourth principle from Benson is that the word "process" as used in the Patent
Act, has a special meaning. The Court stated, "transformation and reduction of an
article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim
that does not include particular machines."'29 "Manning, dyeing, making waterproof
cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, [and] smelting ores" involve the use of chemical
substances or physical acts to transform something from one physical state to a
different state.' While the Court expressly refused to say this was a requirement for
finding a process to be patentable, it did at least implicitly contrast such

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
Id. (quoting Le Roy v. Tathumn, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 155, 175 (1852)).
Id. at 68, (citing O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853)).
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 68 (quoting Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113).
See 409 U.S. at 68-69, (citing The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1,534 (1888)).
Id. at 70.
See id. at 69 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267-68 (1853)).
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transformative processes from the claimed process which it thought amounted to no
more than an abstract idea.3
A fifth idea implicit in Benson is that the word "process" in the Patent Act cannot
be read literally. The patent claim in question is, of course, a process. It is a process
for converting one expression of a number into another expression for the same
number.32 The fact that the claim was, literally, a process, did not suffice to make
it patentable subject matter.
The second Supreme Court decision involving computer programs was Parker
v. Flook.33 The claim in Flook was for a new method of updating an alarm limit for
use in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons. The Court noted that
[d]uring catalytic conversion processes, operating conditions such as temperature, pressure, and flow rates are constantly monitored. When any of these
"process variables" exceeds a predetermined "alarm limit," an alarm may signal
the presence of an abnormal condition indicating either inefficiency or perhaps
danger. Fixed alarm limits may be appropriate for a steady operation, but during
transient operating situations, such as start-up, it may be necessary to "update"
the alarm limits periodically.'
The patent claims were for a three-step method of updating an alarm limit
consisting of: (1) measuring the initial value of the variable (e.g., temperature), (2)
using a mathematical algorithm to calculate an updated alarm limit, and (3)
adjusting the alarm limit to the updated value.
The Court held that the claim in Flook was not proper subject matter under § 101
of the Patent Act. 35 The Court's analysis relied on the premise that mathematical
algorithms should be treated as "basic tools of scientific and technological work"
and "treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art. ' 36 For the Court, the
claim amounted to an attempt to patent the algorithm, something one cannot do, just
as one could not patent a phenomenon of nature.' The Court reiterated the idea that
one cannot patent scientific truths or phenomenon of nature; one can only patent
inventions which involve applications of such things.3" The reason is that such
things, even though not known to humans before, have always existed.3 9
The applicant in Flook tried to distinguish Benson on the ground that the claim
involved not simply a mathematical algorithm, but also involved the additional step

31. See id. at71.
32. See id.
33. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Unless otherwise stated, the facts that follow are paraphrased from Flook, 437
U.S. at 585-86, and refer to this citation.
34. Id. at 585.
35. See id. at 594-95.
36. See id. at 591-92.
37. See id. at 593.
38. See id at 591 (quoting from Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,94 (1939)
("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be."), and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly
of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application
of the law of nature to a new and useful end.")).
39. See id. at 593 n.15.
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of updating the alarm limit.4' The Court disagreed, stating that simply adding "postsolution" activity would not always be sufficient to convert unpatentable subject
matter into patentable subject matter." The post-solution activity in the Flook claim
was not enough to bring the claim into patentable subject matter.
The applicant also tried to distinguish Benson on the ground that the claim did
not wholly pre-empt the mathematical algorithm involved, because the algorithm
could be used outside of the petrochemical and oil-refining industries.42 The Court
recited in the preamble to the patent
implicitly held that a field-of-use restriction
43
claim.
the
save
to
insufficient
was
claims
Three justices dissented in Flook, arguing that the fact that one part of the
method (i.e., the mathematical algorithm) might not be patentable subject matter
does not mean that the entire process should fail the subject matter test." The
dissenting justices accepted the premise that mathematical formula and algorithms
were not patentable subject matter, but argued that the claims were not claiming a
patent on the algorithm. Instead, according to the dissent, the claims used the
algorithm as one step in a method, which was proper subject matter.45
We learn from Flook that, although the claim was for a "process" in the ordinary
sense of the word, this is not the kind of "process" meant by the Patent Act. As the
Court wrote, "[t]he plain language of § 101 does not answer the question."' A
purely literal reading of § 101 is not possible. This tells us that the word "process"
is a term of art.
Flook also shows that mathematical algorithms are to be treated the same as
unpatentable laws of nature or abstract principles.
The last of the Supreme Court cases to confront the issue of whether computer47 The
related inventions qualify as patentable subject matter was Diamondv. Diehr.
claimed invention in Diehr was a process for molding raw, uncured, synthetic
rubber into cured molded products. The process included constantly monitoring the
temperature of the mold, repetitively calculating the proper cure time using the
temperature, and opening the mold automatically when the cure time indicated that
the synthetic rubber was cured. The claim involved the use of a well-known
mathematical equation and the use of a computer to calculate the cure time. In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that the process claimed was proper subject matter under
§ 101, notwithstanding the fact that the claim included calculations using a
mathematical formula.48
The Court framed the issue by saying that "claims must be considered as a
whole."49 They contrasted this approach to that of the dissent, which dissected the

40. See id. at 593.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
at 177-81,
48.
49.

See id. at 590.

See id
See id
See id at 598-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See id. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 588.
450 U.S. 175 (1981). Unless otherwise stated, the facts that follow are paraphrased from Diehr,450 U.S.
and refer to this citation.
See id. at 184.
Id. at 188.
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claims into old and new elements, looking for that which was the newly invented
portion of the claim.' The majority noted that a process claim to a combination of
steps may be patented even though all of the constituents were well known.5
The Court's analysis began by looking at the text of the statute and stated that
"[u]nless otherwise defined, 'words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning."'52 The issue involved the meaning of the word
"process" as used in the Patent Act, and the Court concluded from the Committee
Reports accompanying the 1952 Act that "Congress intended statutory subject
matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.'
The Court in Diehr reiterated its view in Benson that "[t]ransformation and
reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability
of a process claim that does not include particular machines."' Given this
definition, the majority of the Court had little difficulty finding that a process for
transforming uncured rubber into cured rubber products falls within the § 101
category of being a "process."55
The DiehrCourt explained Benson and Flook as standing for the long-established
principles that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable. According to Diehr, Benson held that a mathematical formula or
mathematical algorithm "is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a
patent."5' 6 According to Diehr, the respondent in Flook sought to patent a
mathematical formula for computing an alarm limit, i.e., for computing a number.57
The Court in Diehr emphasized that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula, computer program, or digital computer."" The application of laws of
nature or mathematical formulae to known structures or processes can qualify for
patent protection. The mathematical equation used in the Diehrprocess would not
be patentable subject matter by itself, but "when a process for curing rubber is
devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the equation, that
process is at the very least not barred at the threshold by § 101.""
The Diehrdissenters asserted, as one of their arguments, that the major claims
in Diehr were legally indistinguishable from those in Flook.6 Both cases involve
repetitively calculating updated numbers: in Flook, the numbers were new alarm
limits; in Diehr, they were new cure times. Both cases involve field of use
restrictions: in Flook, the invention dealt with catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons;
in Diehr,the invention dealt with curing rubber. Both cases involve post-solution

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 192-93 & n.15 (referencing Justice Stevens' dissent at 193-220).
Seeid. at 192.
See id. at 182 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979)).
See id. at 182 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
Id. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
See id.
See id. at 185-86.
See it at 186.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.
See id. at 209-210 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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activity: in Flook, it involved changing an alarm limit; in Diehr,it involved opening
the mold.6
Whether or not Diehr is distinguishable from Flook, Diehr was an important
case. For many attorneys, it represented a green-light from the Court, indicating that
patent claims that included computer programs and mathematical algorithms could
be patentable subject matter. Because the earlier Supreme Court cases-Benson and
Flook-hadheld that the claims in those cases were not patentable subject matter,
this issue had remained in doubt until Diehr.
Importantly, Diehrenunciated the test for patentable subject matter as requiring
an examination of the "claims as a whole."'62 The Court said that one should not
dissect claims into old and new elements searching for something novel; novelty
can be found, for example, in a new combination of well-known elements. 63 It
applied this test to find that a claim for a process for molding rubber products was
patentable subject matter, even though it included mathematical calculations as part
of the claim."4
Unfortunately, the Court emphasized that the analysis should begin by looking
at the language of § 101 and that words should be given their "'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning"' unless otherwise defined.6 5 The Court also quoted the
congressional committee statement indicating that statutory
subject matter should
66
"include anything under the sun that is made by man."
These broad statements have done more harm than good. A moment's thought
will show that neither can be taken at face value. First, Benson already showed us
that the words of § 101 cannot be taken in their "ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning. The claim in Benson was a "process" in the common meaning of the
term, yet the Court held that it was not proper subject matter. 6' This indicates that
the terms in § 101 are terms of art and it is unfortunate that the Diehr decision
suggests otherwise.69
As to the congressional statement, copyrighted works (e.g., books, paintings,
sculpture, and music) are "made by man," but that does not make them patentable
subject matter. Congress surely had a more limited meaning when it talked about
"anything under the sun that is made by man." Later in this article, we return to the
idea that the words of § 101 are terms of art in order to better gauge their meaning
and interpret the congressional statement.
Since 1981, the Supreme Court has not again addressed the issue of when
computer-related and mathematical algorithm-related inventions can be patentable
subject matter. Instead, this task has fallen on the lower courts, particularly the
61. Some people believe that Diehreffectively overruled Flook because the facts of Flook and Diehr seem
so similar. See infra notes 293-94. Because the Diehrdecision distinguishes Flook rather than expressly overruling
it, this article proceeds on the assumption that Flook remains good law.
62. See generally Diehr,450 U.S. 175 (1981).
63. See id. at 188.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 182 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
66. d (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
67. See supra text accompanying note 32.
68. See id.
69. One can multiply the examples. Paperback books with novels and CDs with music are articles of
"manufacture," but they are not patentable subject matter. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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C.C.P.A. and its successor, the Federal Circuit. As we shall see, resolving these
issues has been difficult.
THE C.C.P.A. & FEDERAL CIRCUIT DEVELOP TESTS, BUT APPLY
THEM INCONSISTENTLY
While the Supreme Court was developing its theory as to what inventions were
proper subject matter for a patent, the lower courts were developing their own
theory. The Federal Circuit initially adopted the precedents of the C.C.P.A.7 ° Since
the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982, it has developed and
refined its views as to the proper subject matter for patents.7 Unfortunately, the
court has been unable to apply its tests in a consistent manner.
III.

The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test
In the years following Benson, the C.C.P.A. recognized that the Supreme Court's
holding in that case-that the algorithm for converting binary coded decimal to
binary was not proper subject matter-was not a barrier to the patentability of
algorithms in general; rather, it was only a barrier to the patenting of some
mathematicalalgorithms.72
The reason for this conclusion is straightforward. An algorithm is a "step-by-step
procedure for solving a problem or accomplishing some end. 7 3 Thus, every process
involves an "algorithm." Section 101 expressly states that processes can be
patentable subject matter.74 If Benson established that no algorithm could be
patentable, it would have written process patents out of the statute; something that
the Court surely did not intend to do. Therefore, from an early stage, the C.C.P.A.
limited the holding of Benson to mathematical algorithms.
The C.C.P.A. also developed a two-step methodology for deciding whether a
patent claim on a process involved unpatentable subject matter. The methodology
is often called the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, named after the three cases that
developed and refined the test.75 The first step is to determine whether a mathematical algorithm or formula is recited directly or indirectly in the patent claim. 76 If a
mathematical formula or algorithm is recited, then the second step is applied. The
second step is to determine whether the claimed invention is directed to that formula
A.

70. See supra note 10.
71. There are many reported cases dealing with patentable subject matter relating to mathematical
algorithms and computer-related inventions. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994), withdrawn on reh'g en banc, 60
F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Wannerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
1994); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arrhythmia
Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1989); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Abele, 684
F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A.
1979); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
72. See, e.g., In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
73. Id. at 156 n.5.
74. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see also supra note 4 (quoting § 101 in full).
75. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
76. See Abele, 684 F.2d at 905.
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or algorithm itself." If it is, then the claim is nonstatutory.78 On the other hand, if
the mathematical formula or algorithm is applied to, or limited by, physical
elements or process steps, then the claim is statutory under § 101.79
The examples of Benson and Diehr may make this methodology more clear.
Benson involved a claim for converting binary coded decimal numbers into binary
numbers.8" This is a mathematical algorithm, thus satisfying the first step of the
Freeman-Walter-Abeletest. Moreover, the claim is directed to that algorithm itself;
there are no physical elements or processes to which the algorithm applies. Thus,
the claim in Benson is nonstatutory under this test.
Diehr involved a claim for a process for molding rubber products."t The claim
included the use of a mathematical formula for calculating the cure time, thus,
satisfying the first step of the Freeman-Walter-Abeletest. However, the claim was
not simply a claim for the mathematical formula itself, as the formula was used in
the physical process of molding robber.' Thus, the claim in Diehris statutory under
this test.
1. Freeman-Walter-Abele-VersionOne
Although the Federal Circuit has adopted the Freeman-Walter-Abeletest, the test
has been difficult to apply. 3 For example, the court reached opposite conclusions
in two cases having extremely similar claims for new processes.84 In re Grams5
involved claims for a method of diagnosing an abnormal condition in an individual.
The method requires (1) the gathering of data about an individual through clinical
laboratory tests, and (2) analyzing that data to determine whether it indicates any
abnormality and, if so, what kind of abnormality. The analysis involved comparing
the gathered data with predetermined data showing normal conditions for the
various parameters tested and filtering the data to focus on only the portions of the
gathered data responsible for the abnormal condition. The specification in the patent
application describes the method as one to be done using a computer program.
Applying the Freeman-Walter-Abeletest, the court found that the claim included
a mathematical algorithm and that the only physical process step was that of
performing clinical tests to gather data for the algorithm. 6 The addition of a data
gathering step was not sufficient to find the method statutory.8 7 In essence, the court

77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); see also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
81. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
82. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177, 191, 192-93; see also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
83. The Federal Circuit has also adopted other approaches to determine whether these kinds of claims
represent patentable subject matter, and at times has questioned the validity of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. See
infra Parts Ill.A.4 and iLI.B.
84. See Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re
Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
85. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Unless otherwise stated, the facts that follow are paraphrased from In
re Grans, 888 F.2d at 836-37, and refer to this citation.
86. See Grams, 888 F.2d at 839-40.
87. See id at 839. The court quoted the following from In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1978),
as giving the reason why a data gathering step is insufficient:
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found that the patent claim was for the mathematical algorithm itself, therefore,
rendering the patent claim unpatentable.8 8
2. Freeman-Walter-Abele-VersionTwo
Three years later, in Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix, 89 the
Federal Circuit found a very similar method claim to be within the scope of
patentable subject matter.' Arrhythmia involved claims for a method and apparatus
to determine whether a patient was at risk for ventricular tachycardia, a type of heart
arrhythmia which can strike heart attack victims. The method claim requires 1) the
gathering of electrocardiograph data about an individual and 2) analyzing that data
to determine whether it indicates a risk of ventricular tachycardia. The analysis
involved converting the data from an analog form to a digital form, filtering the data
so as to focus on only one portion of the data, computing the value of the amplitude
of the filtered data, and comparing that value to a predetermined level.
The Federal Circuit court found that the claim was drawn to statutory subject
matter.9' The court assumed, without discussion, that the method claim included a
mathematical algorithm.' It found, however, that the claim did not wholly preempt
the algorithm. 93 The process claimed was a "method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the presence or absence of a predetermined level of highfrequency energy in the late QRS signal," and the court noted that this limitation "is
not ignored." The court determined that "[t]hese input signals are not abstractions;
they are related to the patient's heart function."9 5 The results of the mathematical
calculations in Arrhythmia indicated whether the patient was at a high risk for
ventricular tachycardia. This "resultant output is not an abstract number, but is a
signal related to the patient's heart activity." 96
The Arrhythmia court then noted that the "claimed steps of 'converting,'
'applying,' 'determining,' and 'comparing' are physical process steps that transform
one physical, electrical signal into another. The view that "there is nothing
necessarily physical about 'signals' is incorrect." 9 According to the court's

No mathematical equation can be used, as a practical matter, without establishing and

substituting values for the variables expressed therein. Substitution of values dictated by the
formula has thus been viewed as a form of mathematical step. If the steps of gathering and
substituting values were alone sufficient, every mathematical equation, formula, or algorithm
having any practical use would be per se subject to patenting as a "process" under § 101.
Consideration of whether the substitution of specific values is enough to convert the
disembodied ideas present in the formula into an embodiment of those ideas, or into an
application of the formula, is foreclosed by the current state of the law.
Id.
88. See Grams, 888 F.2d at 841.
89. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Unless otherwise stated, the facts that follow are paraphrased from
Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1054-56, and refer to this citation.
90. See id. at 1054.
91. See id. at 1058-59.
92. See iL at 1055. This satisfies the first step in the Freeman-Walter-Abele methodology.
93. See id. at 1059.
94. See id.
95. IkL
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1059 (citing In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787,790 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
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analysis, the claimed method was statutory, because it "comprise[d] an otherwise
statutory process whose mathematical procedures are applied to physical process
steps." 98
3. Evaluation of the Freeman-Walter-AbeleTest
It is difficult to understand why Arrhythmia reaches a different result than that
reached in Grams. The method claimed in Arrhythmia looks virtually identical to
the claim rejected in Grams:99 Both claims were for methods of diagnosing
abnormal medical conditions in patients; both involved data-gathering steps; both
involved numerical processing of that data to determine whether the patient has an
abnormal condition; both involved the use of a computer; and both methods
provided useful information to doctors.
Arrhythmia stated that changing one electrical signal into another is physical," °
but the computer operations in Grams would equally have involved such changes.
Grams, however, said that such a step did not qualify as an appropriate physical
process under the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.'0 ' As a result, the cases are
inconsistent on that point.
Arrhythmia stated that the result of the process was not something "abstract" but
was an indication that the patient was at a high risk for ventricular tachycardia.' °2
But, of course, the result of the process in Grams was an indication of an abnormal
condition in a patient, and, hence, equally abstract or non-abstract. 13
Furthermore, both processes involve gathering data about an individual. The
Arrhythmia court found that the electrocardiograph signal data is not to be ignored
in determining whether the claim was for patentable subject matter. 4 In contrast,
the Grams court said that the clinical laboratory data gathering steps are virtually
irrelevant.'05
In addition to the similarities mentioned above, it is significant to note that both
cases were from the Federal Circuit and both cases applied the Freeman-WalterAbele test. There is no apparent reason why the court should have reached opposite
conclusions in the two cases.
4. Applicability of the Freeman-Walter-AbeleTest Is Questioned
Although the Freeman-Walter-Abeletest was created and has been used by the
C.C.P.A. and the Federal Circuit, its current vitality has been called into question
by more recent decisions. One such case, In re Alappat,'° was a 1994 case which
used a different test. In Alappat, the Federal Circuit stated:

98. See id.
99. Compare Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1054-56, and discussion supra Part UI.A.2., with Inre Grams, 888
F.2d 835, 836-37 (Fed. Cir. 1989), and discussion supra Part l.A.1.
100. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059.
101. See Grams, 888 F.2d at 840.
102. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1054.
103. See Grams, 888 F.2d at 836.
104. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1055.
105. See Grams, 888 F.2d at 840.
106. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); cf In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (suggesting that
it might be better to simply return to the statutory language and the guidance of Supreme Court cases).
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It is thus not necessary to determine whether a claim contains, as merely a part
of the whole, any mathematical subject matter which standing alone would not
be entitled to patent protection. Indeed, because the dispositive inquiry is
whether the claim as a whole is directed to statutory subject matter, it is
a part of the whole, subject matter which
irrelevant that a claim may contain, as
would not be patentable by itself." 7
08
While this statement appears to be a rejection of the Freeman-Walter-Abeletest,'
the Federal Circuit observed in a footnote that attempting to identify whether any
part of a claim recites mathematical subject matter was "not an improper analysis"
These conflicting messages
and might be "helpful under some circumstances.'
within one opinion do nothing to clarify the analysis which lower courts are
supposed to use in determining patentable subject matter.
The Federal Circuit's most recent case, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature FinancialGroup,Inc.,' also appears to reject the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test. The court said that the "district court erred by applying the Freeman-WalterAbele test to determine whether the claimed subject matter was an unpatentable
abstract idea.... After Diehrand Chakrabarty,the Freeman-Walter-Abeletest has
l
little, if any, applicability to determine the presence of statutory subject matter."" .
While these statements strongly suggest that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is no
longer applicable, they seem to leave open the possibility for the test's use,
suggesting that the test may not be completely dead.

The Claims-as-a-WholeTest
which
Another test used by the Federal Circuit draws on language from Diehr
11' 2 It fares
states that the inquiry requires an examination of the "claim as a whole.
no better, however, than the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in providing clear and
workable methods for determining whether a claim falls within patentable subject
matter.
In re Alappat"3 was a six-to-two en banc decision (on the merits) by the Federal
Circuit, in which both the majority and dissent used the Claims-as-a-Whole test."'
The procedural posture of the case was such that not all members of the court
addressed the § 101 issue, but the eight members of the court that did address this
issue produced strikingly different views of how the Claims-as-a-Whole test should
be applied.
B.

107. Id. at 1543.
108. The idea that the analysis should focus on the "claim as a whole" was taken from Diehr. See supra text
accompanying note 49.
109. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543 n.21.
110. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
111. l1 at 1373-74. The court also noted that the test has been the source of much confusion. See id. at 1374
n.5.
112. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) ("In determining the eligibility of respondents'
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be consideredas a whole.") (emphasis added).
113. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). Unless otherwise stated, the facts that follow are paraphrased
from Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1530-40, and refer to this citation.
114. Compareid. at 1543 (majority opinion) with id.at 1582-83 (Archer, C.J. dissenting).
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1. Claims-as-a-Whole Test-Version One
In a sense, the invention in Alappat was almost a purely mathematical calculation
invention. It was drafted, however, as a claim to an apparatus which would do the
calculation. For the majority, this fact by itself was almost determinative in reaching
the conclusion that the claim was for statutory subject matter." 5 For the dissent, the
crucial fact was that the claim covered mathematical calculations." 6 The dissent felt
that one should not be able to evade the proscription on patenting mathematical
algorithms by drafting claims in apparatus form." 7
The invention in Alappat involved a way to generate a smooth waveform on the
screen of an oscilloscope. The screen is at the front of a cathode-ray tube (CRT) and
is made up of an array (or raster) of pixels arranged in vertical columns and
horizontal rows. To produce an image on the screen, appropriate sets of these pixels
are illuminated. Prior to this invention, a waveform displayed on the screen might
appear jagged or appear to oscillate. This effect is called "aliasing."
The Alappat invention was an anti-aliasing system which involved varying the
illumination intensity of the pixels in order to make the waveform display appear
to be smooth and continuous. In particular, the invention was one for calculating the
various intensities for each of the pixels in the display."'
The principal claim was drafted in apparatus form. It was a claim for a rasterizer,
an apparatus which was made up of four elements, drafted in "means for" language.
As described by the court, the four elements were: two arithmetic logic circuits, a
pair of barrel shifters, and a read-only memory, or, in each case, their equivalents.
The elements were required to perform mathematical calculations and to put out the
resulting data.
The majority found that the claim was for statutory subject matter." 9 The
majority's analysis began with the observation that the claim was for a "machine,"
which is one of the four categories listed as subject matter in § 101. ° Although
perhaps tempted to stop with that short answer to the issue, the majority went on to
consider whether the claim might be barred by the "mathematical algorithm"
exception121

115. See id. at 1542. The majority emphasized that the claim fell within the literal words of § 101, but they
did not rest their decision on this point. See id.
116. See id. at 1554 (Archer, C.J., dissenting on the merits).
117. See id. at 1561-62.
118. It should be noted that the claim was directed solely at the means for doing the mathematical
calculations. The claims did not include the waveform that could be generated nor the display screen on which the

waveform would be displayed. In other words, while the claims produced numerical representations which could
be used to generate an anti-aliased waveform, they did not involve generating the waveform or displaying it.

Recent decisions of the Federal Circuit contain language which suggests that the Alappat claims include
displaying a waveform on a monitor. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("In Alappat, we held that data, transformed by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations to produce a smooth waveform display on a rasterizer monitor .... ). Such an
interpretation of Alappat is incorrect.
119. SeeAlappat, 33 F.3d at 1536.
120. See id
121. See id. at 1542. The majority raised the issue of whether this exception even applies to apparatus claims,
but provided two reasons for not considering this issue. See id. Fwrst, the court's own precedent (and perhaps
Supreme Court analysis) seemed to suggest that the exception does apply. See id Second, even if the exception
applies to apparatus claims, the subject matter in this case did not fall within the exception. See id
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The majority interpreted § 101 expansively, noting that "any" new and useful
process or machine may be patented and that the Supreme Court has stated that §
101 extends to "anything under the sun that is made by man."'" Acknowledging
that the Supreme Court has carved out some exceptions to an overly expansive
reading, the court interpreted Supreme Court decisions as stating that there are three
categories of subject matter that cannot be patented: laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas." 3
Mathematical algorithms, according to the majority, are not a fourth excluded
category.' 24 Instead, only some kinds of mathematical subject matter are excluded,
such as mathematical subject matter which, "standing alone, represents nothing
' ' 25
more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application.
The majority then applied the Claims-as-a-Whole test and proceeded to examine
Alappat's claims "to see whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a
disembodied mathematical concept, whether categorized as a mathematical formula,
mathematical equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in essence
represents nothing more than a 'law of nature,' 'natural phenomenon,' or 'abstract
idea."" 26 Although the four claimed means elements are used to transform one set
of data into another set of data, the majority found that the claim was not for a
disembodied mathematical concept which might be considered as an "abstract
idea."'27 Rather, the claim was for "a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete,
and tangible result."' 8
The methodology used by the majority in Alappat looks very much like that of
the Arrhythmia court. The Alappat court acknowledged that the claim involved
calculated had any
numerical calculations, but focused on whether the numbers so
129
real-world meaning and whether the calculation was useful.
2. Claims-as-a-Whole Test-Version Two
The dissent's analysis could hardly be more different. The dissent notes that the
terms used in § 101--"process," "machine," "manufacture," and "composition of
matter"--are terms of art which must be interpreted, not in their literal sense, but
in accord with the context of patent law.' 3° For example, a claim to a compact disc
or piano roll containing a newly discovered song does not become patentable
subject matter simply by virtue of being regarded as a "manufacture."''
Analyzing the Supreme Court trilogy of Benson, Flook, and Diehr,the dissent
found that the posing and solving of a mathematical function is nonstatutory subject
122. Id. at 1542 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)) (emphasis added).
123. See id.
124. See id at 1543.
125. Id
126. Id. at 1544.
127. See id.
128. Id
129. See id. at 1542-44.
130. See id. at 1553. (Archer,C.J., dissenting on the merits).
131. See id. at 1553-54. The dissent also notes that abstract ideas, laws of nature,and natural phenomena
are not patentable subject matter, but emphasizes that it is erroneous to characterize non-patentable subject matter
at 1553 n.13. Instead, "[defining patentable subject matter is the raison d'etre
as an "exception" to § 101. See id.
of § 101." Id. In this article, we need not be concerned with the label placed on non-patentable subject matter.
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matter.3 2 It remains nonstatutory even if the mathematics are limited to performance in a computer, the mathematical operations have some application in a
specific technology, or the solution of the function "represents" something of
physical or technological relevance.'
The dissent, like the majority, examined the claims "as a whole."'' For the
dissent, the invention in this case is the rasterizer, which is an arrangement of
circuitry elements for converting data into other data.'35 The rasterizer begins with
two numbers and ends up with an array of numbers, produced by the use of a
mathematical process." The dissent found that this dooms the claim to the category
of nonstatutory subject matter. The invention is simply the mathematical operation
and the fact that it is claimed by means of the apparatus which will do the
calculation is simply a "charade."'3
3. Evaluation of the Claims-as-a-Whole Test
The striking thing about the majority and dissenting opinions in Alappat is that
they are both compelling. The majority is clearly correct that the claim is for a
machine, which is, therefore, literally within the statutory language of § 101. The
majority is also correct that the mathematical calculations in this case are put to
practical use in creating a smooth waveform on the screen of an oscilloscope. On
the other hand, the dissent is equally correct in saying that the invention is simply
for a machine which converts one set of numbers into another set of numbers. The
dissent is also correct in observing that the majority analysis would presumably
allow a patent for a compact disc or piano roll containing a newly discovered song.
Put simply, looking at the Claims-as-a-Whole does not seem to be a touchstone
for determining whether a mathematical algorithm-related claim or a computerrelated claim passes the test for being statutory subject matter.
IV.

A DISTRICT COURT TRIES TO APPLY THE TESTS AND IS
REVERSED
The Freeman-Walter-Abeleand Claims-as-a-Whole tests do not provide clear
methods of analysis. Different judges on the Federal Circuit reach inconsistent
results when they use these tests. It is not surprising that lower courts would also
have difficulty applying these tests.
While there are almost no district court decisions dealing with whether
mathematical algorithm-related patents or computer-related patents are patentable
subject matter, in 1996 the district court in Massachusetts addressed this issue in
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 3 ' Despite

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 1557.
See id.
Compare id. (dissenting view of Archer, CJ.) with id. at 1543 (majority view).
See id. at 1563.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1564.
927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in good faith, the district court was
reversed in 1998 by a panel of the Federal Circuit. 39
The District Court Decision in State Street
The invention claimed in State Street." is a data processing system for a
particular kind of investment vehicle-a so-called "Hub and Spoke Financial
Services Configuration." Signature Financial Group ("Signature") acts as an
administrator and accounting agent for mutual funds. In a "Hub and Spoke"
arrangement, a family of mutual funds (the "Spokes") pools its assets into a
partnership (the "Hub"). This kind of arrangement provides for economies of scale
with regard to the costs of fund administration and has beneficial tax consequences.
Signature obtained a patent on the data processing system needed to administer
this kind of "Hub and Spoke" arrangement. The accounting requires a daily
allocation of income, capital gains, and expenses or investment losses, as well as
keeping track of changes in assets as individual investors add or withdraw funds
from their accounts and as the market value of the assets in the funds fluctuate.
Signature's patent was drafted in means-plus-function language as an
apparatus. 4 ' The "means-for" language of the claims is interpreted to refer to
devices or apparatus disclosed in the specification. In this case, the specification
disclosed that the patent relates to a personal computer and associated computer
programs.
In a nutshell, the patent is for the computer and computer programs which
perform the accounting functions of a "Hub and Spoke" family of mutual funds.
These accounting functions are mathematical calculations. The programs take a set
of mathematical data and generate other mathematical data. The resulting data
represent the increases or decreases in the assets of the partnership and the distinct
funds in the partnership; the daily income, expenses, gains and losses for the
partnership and each of the funds; and the year-end income, expenses, and capital
gains or losses for the partnership and each of the funds in the partnership.

A.

139. See 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
140. 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996). Unless otherwise noted, the facts that follow are paraphrased from
the district court decision, State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 504-06, and refer to this citation.
141. Claim one reads:
(1) A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio
established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of funds, comprising:
a) computer processor means for processing data;
b) storage means for storing data on a storage medium;
c) first means for initializing the storage medium;
d) second means for processing data regarding assets in the portfolio and each of the funds
from a previous day and data regarding increases or decreases in each of the funds, assets and
for allocating the percentage share that each fund holds in the portfolio;
e) third means for processing data regarding daily incremental income, expenses, and net
realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund;
f) fourth means for processing data regarding daily net unrealized gain or loss for the
portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; and
g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate year-end income, expenses, and
capital gain or loss for the portfolio and each of the funds.
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State Street Bank & Trust Co. ("State Street") also administers and acts as an
accounting agent for mutual funds. State Street brought a declaratory judgment
action against Signature seeking to have the patent declared invalid.
The district court held the patent invalid. It began its analysis by reviewing the
statutory language, the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions, the Freeman-WalterAbele test, other Federal Circuit precedent, and the Guidelines issued by the Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO"). 142 The district court used the Freeman-WalterAbele test or 143a close variant thereof, referring to it as "the best clue to
patentability."'
The first step in the district court's analysis was to determine whether the claims
recited, directly or indirectly, a mathematical algorithm. The claims were "meansfor" claims, meaning that they were for devices or apparatus. Even so, the court
found that the apparatus was designed to solve a mathematical problem-to make
the accounting calculations necessary in order to administer the "Hub and Spoke"
mutual fund system. 44
The second step in the analysis was to determine whether the claimed invention
was applied or limited by physical elements or process steps. The court looked to
whether the invention transforms or reduces subject matter to a different state or
thing-i.e., whether there has been a physical transformation of something.
The court concluded that there was no physical transformation. 145 The invention
merely changed one set of numbers into another. The court distinguished
Arrhythmia by saying that the patent in that case measured physical objects or
phenomena (i.e., electrocardiograph signals), and distinguished Alappat by saying
that the patent in that case physically converted data into a different form (i.e., into
the display of a smooth wave-form). 46
The district court reinforced its decision by applying the so-called "business
methods exception" and it reached the same conclusion. 47 The court noted that
methods of doing business and business plans are not patentable, citing to a number
of patent treatises"4 and cases. 149 The court further noted that allowing a patent on
this business method would mean that any other company seeking to implement a
"Hub and Spoke" configuration would be required to obtain permission from
Signature."5 According to the court, "patenting an accounting system necessary to
carry on a certain type of business is tantamount to a patent on the business
itself."'"' This should not be allowed because this would be like a patent on the
abstract idea of this kind of business, and abstract ideas are not patentable.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See
See
See
See
See
See

State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 507-12.
id. at511.
id. at 513.
id. at 514.
id.
id. at 515.

148. See id (citing I DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILrrY, VALIDrrY

AND INFRINGEMENT, § 1.03[5], at 1-75 (1990); 1 ERNESt BANKBRIDGE LscomB I, WALKER ON PATENTS § 2:17,
at 171 (3d ed. 1984); 1 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.02[3], at 6-82 (2d ed. 1995)).

149. See id. (citing Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir.
1949); Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908)).
150. See id. at 516.
151. See id.
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The Federal CircuitReverses
A draft of this article was prepared before the Federal Circuit decided State
Street.152 In that draft, I had written:
B.

One can readily predict that the Federal Circuit will either affirm or reverse this
case depending upon which line of cases and mode of analysis the particular
panel chooses to follow.
If the Federal Circuit panel follows the reasoning of Grams or of the Alappat
dissent, the panel will affirm. It will agree that the patent involves nothing more
than mathematical calculations and that drafting the claims so that the patent
claims an apparatus for doing these calculations cannot change the outcome.
On the other hand, if the Federal Circuit panel follows the reasoning of
Arrhythmia or of the Alappat majority, it will reverse. It will note that the claims
are for an apparatus, which on its face is one of the categories of patentable
subject matter. It will continue by noting that these are not purely abstract
mathematical calculations. Instead, these calculations represent physical
phenomena-assets held by a partnership and the funds in the partnership. The
calculations involve physical transformations of one physical set of data into
another set of data. Moreover, this claim does not wholly preempt the
mathematical algorithm, because it is limited to the specific apparatus disclosed
in the specifications. The claim, as a whole, is not to a disembodied mathematical formula which represents a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea. Rather, it is to a specific device.
At this place in this article, my point is not to say that one or another of these
panels would be right or wrong. My point is that either result is possible given
the methods of analysis that are presently being used. In fact, it is likely that the
result will be determined more by the panel which is drawn than by any
principled analysis.'53
Now that the decision has been issued, we see that the panel chose to follow the
method of analysis done by the majority in Alappat.Therefore, the panel reversed
the district court. The court's logic was virtually identical to that predicted for this
mode of analysis.
The court indicated that the claims were directed to a "machine," one of the
categories of statutory subject matter allowed under § 101.' Following the analysis
in Alappat, the court stated that Congress intended for § 101 to be read without any
restrictions, noting that it states that "any" new and useful process or machine may
has stated that § 101 extends to "anything
be patented and that the Supreme Court
' 55
under the sun that is made by man." 1
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court has carved out some exceptions to an
overly expansive reading, the court interpreted Supreme Court decisions as stating
that there are three categories of subject matter that cannot be patented: laws of
152. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 851 (1999).
153. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
154. The "means-for" language of the claims was interpreted to refer to devices or apparatus (and their
equivalents) disclosed in the specification. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376. In this case, the specification
disclosed that the patent related to a personal computer, a data disk, and four arithmetic logic circuits.
155. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
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nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. 56 The court further stated that "the
[Supreme Court] has held that mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject
matter to the extent that they are merely abstract ideas.""15
The key to the opinion is the court's observation that "[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful.' From a practical
standpoint, this means that to be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a
'useful' way."' 8
The court held that the mathematical calculations in the patent claims are
transformations of data, representing discrete dollar amounts.' 59 Such transformations are a practical application of the mathematical algorithm and are "useful."
This means that the claims are proper statutory subject matter.
In commenting on the district court's analysis, the panel rejected use of the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test and, instead, used the Claims-as-a-Whole test."W The
panel also stated that the "business method" exception to patentable subject matter
was no longer a valid doctrine. 6 '
C.

Comments on the FederalCircuitDecision
The method of analysis used by this panel was not surprising. What was
unknown before the decision issued was whether the court would use this mode of
analysis or the one used by other judges of the Federal Circuit.
Unfortunately, this decision breaks no new ground in its mode of analysis and
does little to clarify the issues involved. It is a straightforward matter to lay out
problems with the analysis. They are the same problems pointed out by the dissent
in Alappat.'62
First, the State Street panel treats § 101 as if it could be read literally and the
decision repeats the language from the Committee Reports that "anything under the
sun made by man" is patentable
subject matter.163 A little common sense shows that
64
true.
be
this cannot possibly
Second, the State Street decision interprets Supreme Court decisions as saying
that there are three classes of non-patentable subject matter-abstract ideas, natural
phenomena, and laws of nature-and that mathematical algorithms are excluded
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id at 1373-74.

161. See id. at 1375. The court noted that neither the Federal Circuit nor the C.C.P.A. ever invoked the
business method exception to deem an invention unpatentable. See id. Every case in which the business methods
doctrine was mentioned was decided on other grounds. See id.
162. See supra Part HIL.B.2.
163. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 n.3 (citing S. REP. No. 82-1979 at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. No. 821923 at 6 (1952)).
164. As the Alappat dissent noted, new music on CDs is something new created by man and it is a
"manufacture," but it would not be new patentable subject matter. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553-54 (Fed.
Cir. 1994). In addition, Supreme Court cases teach that the word "process" in the statute cannot be given its literal
interpretation. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding that a process claim was not patentable
subject matter); Parker v. Hook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding that a process claim was not patentable subject
matter); see also infra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
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only to the extent that they are abstract ideas. The Supreme Court decisions,
however,
say quite clearly that mathematical algorithms are non-patentable subject
65

matter.

Third, the State Street decision states that "the [Supreme Court] has held that
mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter to the extent that they are
merely abstract ideas."'" In fact, the Supreme Court went much further than that in
Flook, stating that mathematical algorithms are "treated as though [they] were a
familiar part of the prior art,"' 67 indicating that mathematical algorithms are not
patentable subject matter whether or not they are abstract ideas and whether or not
they have been previously known. Nothing in the Court's later decision in Diehr
repudiates this idea."
Fourth, the core of the State Street opinion is the court's observation that
"[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are
merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not
'useful.' From a practical standpoint, this means that to be patentable, an algorithm
must be applied in a 'useful' way."'" The problem with this statement is that it is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Flook7 The patent claims in
Flook were for a method of updating an alarm limit in the catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons.71 ' The mathematical algorithms in those claims were certainly
applied in a "useful way" in the sense meant by the Federal Circuit in State Street,
yet the Supreme
Court held the Flook patent invalid for lack of patentable subject
72
matter.1
In short, the State Street decision contains a conclusion, but does not contain
adequate reasoning. The Federal Circuit makes statements which do not withstand
cursory thought and either interprets or ignores Supreme Court decisions in order
to justify the result it wants to reach.

165. See supra text accompanying note 36.
166. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
167. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978).
168. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
169. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
170. The Federal Circuit's practice of disregarding Flook continues a trend begun more than twenty years
ago by the C.C.P.A. that elated this comment from Justice Stevens, in his Diehrdissent:
Although the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in several post-Flook decisions held that
program-related inventions were not patentable subject matter under § 101, in general Flook was
not enthusiastically received by that court. In In re Bergy, the majority engaged in an extensive
critique of Flook, concluding that this Court had erroneously commingled "distinct statutory
provisions which are conceptually unrelated." In subsequent cases, the court construed Flook
as resting on nothing more than the way in which the patent claims had been drafted, and it

expressly declined to use the method of claim analysis spelled out in that decision. The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals has taken the position that, if an application is drafted in a way
that discloses an entire process as novel, it defines patentable subject matter even if the only
novel element that the inventor claims to have discovered is a new computer program. The court
interpreted Flook in this manner in its opinion in this case. In my judgment, this reading of
Flook--although entirely consistent with the lower court's expansive approach to § 101 during
the past 12 years--trivializes the holding in Flook, the principle that underlies Benson, and the

settled line of authority reviewed in those opinions.
Diehr,450 U.S. at 204-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

171. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.
172. Compare State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373, with Flook, 437 U.S. at 595.
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V. THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE GUIDELINES
The PTO issued guidelines to its examiners in evaluating patent applications
which include computer programs and mathematical algorithms."' The charitable
view would be that, since the reasoning used in the cases is unhelpful and the cases
are not consistent with one another, the PTO, which has to try to follow the law as
interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, was put in an impossible
position. Thus, the Guidelines
are muddled because they track the inconsistency and
74
the poor reasoning.
A closer reading, however, suggests that the PTO has deliberately adopted a view
minimizing, if not quite eliminating, the subject matter inquiry.7 7 This means that
the Guidelines now err on the side of minimizing the chances of a claimed
computer-related or mathematical algorithm-related invention being rejected as
lacking patentable subject matter.
The PTO does this by selecting which cases to follow and which language in
those cases it wishes to follow. Four examples indicate this tendency. First, the
Guidelines quote a Supreme Court decision, stating that "a complete definition of
the scope of § 101, reflecting congressional intent, is that any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter under the sun that is made
by man is the proper subject matter of a patent. '17 6 As this article will show, "7 7 the
language that patentable subject matter should include "anything under the sun that
is made by man" is, rather obviously, overly broad and cannot be taken literally,
notwithstanding the use of that phrase by congressional committees and the
Supreme Court. By simply accepting this overly broad statement as accurate, the
PTO minimizes the inquiry into patentable subject matter, thereby increasing the
risk of issuing patents for claims that should be rejected for lack of patentable
subject matter.
Second, the PTO furthers this tendency toward minimizing the § 101 subject
matter inquiry by its selection of quotations from specific cases. This occurs, for
example, in a footnote where the Guidelines cite Alappat, stating that the Federal
Circuit has adopted what can be characterized as a simple textualist view of § 101:
"The plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may be patented if it meets the requirements for patentability set forth
in Title 35, such as those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112."'17
This statement suffers from numerous defects. For example, while Alappat was
an en banc decision, the entire court did not address the issue of patentable subject

173. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (1996) [hereinafter
Guidelines].
174. Others have also commented on inconsistencies within the Guidelines. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley &
David W. O'Brien, EncouragingSoftware Reuse, 49 STAN. L REV. 255,282-84 (1997).
175. This has been noted by others. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineeringand the Rise of Electronic
Vigilantism: Intellectual PropertyImplicationsof "Lock-Out" Programs,68 S.CAL. L REV. 1091, 1162 n.369
(1995).
176. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7481 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980)).
177. See infra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
178. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7481 n.21 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cit. 1994)).
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matter because some members felt that the court did not have jurisdiction.' 79 One
should not, therefore, cite Alappat as representing the views of the Federal Circuit.
Additionally, some members of the Federal Circuit believe that the terms used in
§ 101 are terms of art, rather than being "plain and unambiguous."'' 0 The
Guidelines fail to note this discrepancy. Finally, a moment's reflection shows that
the terms in § 101 are anything but "plain and unambiguous." This idea is
developed below,' but the point here is simply that the Guidelines engage in
selective quotation in order to produce a certain point of view rather than presenting
a fair and unbiased cross-section of relevant views.
Third, the Guidelines cite and seemingly try to follow numerous cases.
Interestingly, the Guidelines cite Arrhythmia numerous times, but do not cite Grams
at all. The Guidelines give no indication that Grams and Arrhythmia are inconsistent and nothing is said about how or why the PTO chose the viewpoint represented
by Arrhythmia rather than by Grams."2 By its choice of which cases to cite, the
PTO indicates that it intends to minimize rejections based on subject matter
grounds.
A fourth indication of the same tendency toward minimizing the subject matter
inquiry is the fact that, at one point near the beginning of the Guidelines, the subject
matter requirement is treated as equivalent with the requirement that the invention
be useful.8 3 Such an approach would entirely eliminate the issue of patentable
subject matter. Fortunately, other portions of the Guidelines don't follow this
approach, the PTO presumably recognizing that the Patent Act contains these as
distinct requirements. 84
What implications can we draw from the Guidelines and its approach to
patentable subject matter? Initially, it should be observed that nothing in the
Guidelines prove that it correctly interprets the law. As observed, the Guidelines
have selectively interpreted cases and indicate that the PTO has adopted a certain
policy toward the subject matter inquiry.
In addition, we should not conclude that the subject matter issue is moot.
Because of the Guidelines, there will be few new cases coming to the Federal
Circuit through appeals from the patent examination process in the PTO. Instead,
cases involving patentable subject matter for computer-related and mathematical
algorithm-related inventions will have to be raised in infringement or declaratory
judgment actions. State Street. 5 is one such case. The subject matter issue remains
a very real issue, but it will now be raised primarily in contested proceedings rather

179. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1530 (identifying five of the eleven members of the en banc court as declining
to join the opinion of the court addressing the issue of patentable subject matter (three dissented and two did not
reach the issue)).
180. See id at 553 (Archer, C.J., dissenting on the merits).
181. See infra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
182. Other commentators have repeatedly pointed out inconsistencies in the decisions of the courts on this
issue and perhaps it is not proper for an administrative agency to tell the courts that its decisions are inconsistent.
See sources cited infra note 289.
183. See infra note 307.
184. See infra notes 302-07 and accompanying text.
185. 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999).
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than in ex parte proceedings. One hopes that this will produce clearer thinking and
analysis in the future.
VI. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The starting point in determining patentable subject matter is the language of the
They are
statute. Section 101 lists four classes of patentable subject matter.
"process," "machine," "manufacture," and "composition of matter."'' 8 6
This starting point should not be mistaken for a complete and final answer. In
fact, as we quickly realize, it does not get us very far. In the sections that follow, we
clear away some possible misconceptions and develop a framework for analyzing
the subject matter issue.
The Words in Section 101 Are Terms of Art; They CannotBe Understoodby
Using Their OrdinaryMeaning
Case law has provided two conflicting kinds of statements about the meaning of
the words in § 101. Some cases say that these words are terms of art and have to be
understood in the context of patent law. Other cases say that the words should be
understood as having their ordinary common meaning. It is time to eliminate this
conflict. A little reflection shows that the words are terms of art and cannot be given
their common meaning.
In Parker v. Flook,187 the question was whether a process for updating alarm
limits was patentable subject matter. The Court wrote:
A.

The plain language of § 101 does not answer the question. It is true, as
respondent argues, that his method is a "process" in the ordinary sense of the
word. But that was also true for the algorithm, which described a method of
converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals, that was
involved in Gotschalk v. Benson. The holding that the discovery of that method
could not be patented as a "process" forecloses a purely literal reading of §
101.188
On the other hand, in Diehr,the Court used a plain meaning analysis of § 101. "In
cases of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. Unless
otherwise defined, 'words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."'"8 9
Similarly, judges on the Federal Circuit have expressed polar opposite thoughts
about whether the terms in § 101 can be read literally or not. 90

186. See supra note 4.
187. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
188. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 588-89.
189. Diehr,450 U.S. at 182 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,42 (1979)).
190. Compare, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., dissenting) (the words
in § 101 are terms of art), with State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (§ 101 is plain and unambiguous); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (§ 101 is "plain
and unambiguous"); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061-62, 1064 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Rader, J., concurring) ("The language of section 101 conveys no implication that the Act extends patent
protection to some subcategories of machines or processes and not to others.... Courts should give 'process' its
literal and predictable meaning").
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It is evident that a "plain meaning" or literalist approach to § 101 will not work.
A compact disc containing a newly created song is not patentable subject matter
even though, literally, the disc is a "manufacture." A paperback book containing a
newly written novel is not patentable even though the book is a "manufacture."1 91
A purely mental method of improving gymnastic performances by having the
gymnast repeatedly mentally visualize his or her entire routine prior to performing
it should not qualify as patentable subject matter even though, literally, this method
is a "process."'" And a machine containing acrylic cams that guide a mechanical
hand to write the word "faster" over and over again as the wheels spin should not
qualify as patentable subject matter even though, literally, this is a "machine." ' 93
Congress could not have intended a plain meaning interpretation for these words.194
To be sure, the word "any" in § 101 means that the words "process," "machine,"
etc., are to be interpreted broadly, but a broad interpretation is not the same as a
literal interpretation. The words "process," "machine," etc., must be interpreted
within the confines of their meanings as terms of art. The difficult issue is
determining their meaning as terms of art."5
Put simply, in every case, one must ask not whether the invention falls within the
ordinary meaning of the words of § 101, but whether the invention falls within the
meaning of the words of § 101 understood as terms of art.' The time is overdue for
courts to recognize this point.
B.

Not Everything Under the Sun That Is Made by Man Is PatentableSubject
Matter
The legislative history regarding the meaning of the terms in § 101 provides no
guidance in determining the meaning of those words as terms of art. In Diamond v.
Diehr,t 97 the Supreme Court sought to interpret the word "process" in the Patent
Act. In doing so, it stated:

191. See 1 ClusuM, supranote 7, § 1.02[4] and accompanying text.
192. In addition, in both Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978), the Court held that the claimed "processes" were not statutory subject matter.
193. Such a "machine" is described in a recent article concerning artistic expression. See Julie Flaherty,
Technical Art That Exalts Ideas, N.Y. TPMEs, May 7,1998, at GI. This kind of "machine" does nothing useful and
would be unpatentable for lack of utility. Furthenmore, such an apparatus fails the test for patentable subject matter
because it is not the kind of machine which is meant by the Patent Act. The patent system is limited to new
discoveries which promote the progress of "useful arts." See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966);
see also infra text accompanying notes 206-34.
194. Similarly, § 101 provides that anyone who "invents or discovers" anything within one of the four
categories satisfies the subject matter requirement. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added). Courts have
consistently stated that "discoveries" of naturally occurring substances do not qualify as the right kind of
"inventions" because the substance existed prior to its discovery. See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 588-89, 591 (1978).
A literalist interpretation of the word "discover," however, would negate such an objection.
195. Professor Samuelson has noted that the meaning of the word "process" has long been debated. See
Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against PatentProtectionfor Algorithms and Other Computer
Program-RelatedInventions, 39 EMORY LJ. 1025, 1033 n.23 (1990). If a literalist meaning had been intended
from the beginning, this debate would not have existed.
196. Section 101 of the Patent Act also uses the word "discovers." See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). A literal
interpretation of § 101 would indicate that someone who discovered a new naturally-occurring chemical would pass
the subject matter test. Such an interpretation of § 101 is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's statements that natural
phenomena are not patentable subject matter. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 (1978).
197. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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[I]n order to determine its meaning we may not be unmindful of the Committee
Reports accompanying the 1952 Act which inform us that Congress intended
statutory
subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by
t, 9
man.

The Court made this comment while emphasizing that the categories of statutory
subject matter are to be read expansively.' 99
While it might be tempting to take the Committee Reports' statement literally,
the same examples as those given above show that the statement is not literally true.
A new novel or play, new music, and new paintings are all new creations and may
deserve intellectual property protection. That protection, however, should be under
the copyright system, not the patent system. These examples show that there are
new creations "made by man" which are not patentable subject matter. 2' The
Committee Reports' language reinforces the idea that the scope of patentable
subject matter should be interpreted broadly, but we must still determine that
breadth. The Committee Reports do not provide guidance for determining the limits
of that breadth.
C.

ConstitutionalLimits on Patentability
This article has shown that the words "process," "machine," "manufacture," and
"composition of matter" are terms of art and that neither the statutory language of
§ 101 nor the legislative history concerning that section can be relied upon to
determine the scope of meaning of these words.
In addition, on many occasions the Court has stated that patents cannot issue for
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.2 "1 These statements are
interesting because they indicate a class of additional limitations on patentable
subject matter. These are additional limitations because, for the most part, laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas do not fall within any of the four
classes of patentable subject matter listed in § 101. For example, a law of nature

198. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)).
199: See id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (noting that "Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.").
200. Accord Chiappetta, supra note 11, at 130; Stem 1998 article, supra note 11, at 186 n.12.

201. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 ("Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas."); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,67 (1972) ("Phenomena of nature, though
just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools
of scientific and technological work"); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ([P]atents

cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature ....
They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim
to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes.); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,94
(1939) ("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be."); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) ("An idea of itself is not patentable ....
");
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 62, 116 (1853) ("Mhe discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not
patentable."); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) ("A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right.").
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such as e=mc is not a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
under the ordinary meanings of those terms.
To determine the meaning of the terms in § 101 and to understand the additional
limitations on patentable subject matter announced by the Supreme Court, we look
to the Constitution. '° One might say that "[w]hen all else fails, read the Constitution.

'

The Constitution states that "Congress shall have Power. . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' This
provision is the underpinning of our copyright and patent laws.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly considered the Constitution in construing
patent statutes. For example, in one of the most important cases construing the
present Patent Act, Grahamv. John Deere Co., 5 the Court wrote that:
The [patent] clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified
authority ... is limited to the promotion of advances in the "useful arts."
. . . Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the

patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to
restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a

patent system which by constitutional command must "promote the Progress of
... useful Arts." This is the standard expressed in the Constitutionand it may
not be ignored.'

202. Statutory interpretation is often done by looking (1) at the statutory language, (2) at congressional intent
as shown by legislative history, and (3) at the policies which the legislation is designed to further. This article has
already shown that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history can be used in this area.
A policy-onented approach could go a long way toward explaining many of the statements made by the Supreme
Court which are discussed in this article. For example, one policy underlying the Patent Act is that a patent must
provide a benefit to society. This policy certainly underlies the Court's statements that while one cannot patent a
law of nature, one may patent an innovative application of a law of nature. See infra note 223 and accompanying
text.
Other policies underlying the Patent Act are that patents provide an incentive for inventors to create new
patentable inventions; that patents should not withdraw anything from the public domain; and that a patent must
represent a significant advance in applied knowledge.
It might be that one could produce an acceptable theory of patentable subject matter by relying on these kinds
of policies, but this seems doubtful, unless the broad-brsh kinds of policy statements just given can be refined into
more specific ones. Since the Patent Act does not provide any guidance for making such refinements, this does not
seem to be feasible without resort to the Constitution. For this reason, this article appeals directly to the
Constitution, rather than using a two-step argument from the Constitution through policy to deal with the issues
involved.
203. With apologies to the late Judge Helen Nies of the Federal Circuit, who wrote "[w]hen all else fails, read
the statute." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkins Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1559 (Fed, Cir. 1995) (Nies, J.,
dissenting). Judge Nies was echoing Judge Randall Rader of the same court, who had written, "when all else fails
.... consult the statute." Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1066 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Rader, J., concurring).
204. U.S. CoNsT. art. l, § 8, cl. 8.
205. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
206. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

Similarly, the Court construed earlier patent statutes as incorporating constitutional standards. For example, in determining whether a device was an "invention"
or "discovery," constituting patentability, the Court, in Cuno Engineering Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp.," relied on the constitutional standards. "We cannot
conclude that his skill in making this contribution reached the level of inventive
genius which the Constitution, Art. L § 8, authorizes Congress to reward." 20 8
The Grahamand Cuno cases trace back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,2" in which
the Court held that a mere substitution of materials was not enough to sustain a
patent. The Court said that "the improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic,
not that of the inventor. '210 While Hotchkiss did not explicitly mention the
Constitution, the "invention" requirement was not based on the statute. The explicit
constitutional references in Graham and Cuno, cases that build on Hotchkiss,
indicate that Hotchkiss was using a constitutional analysis.
The Hotchkiss requirement of "invention" has now been codified as the
':obviousness" requirement. 211 It is important to realize, however, that the Court has
indicated that this requirement began as a constitutional requirement. In fact, the
Court in Graham reiterated that the statutory requirement must meet constitutional
minimums:
"This is the standardexpressed in the Constitutionand it may not be
212
ignored.t

The "invention" requirement, imposed by the Constitution for a work to be
patentable, is analogous to the "originality" requirement imposed by the Constitution as a minimum standard for a work to be copyrightable. 213 ' Both of these
standards indicate that the Constitution imposes some minimal standards of
creativity in order for a work to be protected by copyright or patent.
The language in Graham goes further than a reference to the "invention"
requirement. The Court noted that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of
patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or
to restrict free access to materials already available."2" 4
This statement implies a second constitutional standard for patentability. The
Court reads the Constitution as limiting us to a patent system in which there must
be a quid pro quo of public benefit in order for a patent to issue. 2 1s A new patent
must "promote the Progress of... useful Arts. 2 t6 This requirement can be stated
in terms of the constitutional word "discoveries." There is no "discovery" by
someone who seeks a patent that would remove existing knowledge from the public

207. 314 U.S. 84 (1941), modified on other grounds, 314 U.S. 587 (1942) (mem.).
208. Id.at 91.
209. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
210. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
211. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
212. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (emphasis added).
213. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see also infra notes 234-35
and accompanying text.
214. Graham,383 U.S. at 6.
215. See id.

216. U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl. 8.
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2
domain. 21 7 Congress cannot enact a patent law that would allow this to happen.
In the present Patent Act, this constitutional requirement is codified in part by the
novelty requirements.219
In Graham,the Court noted that congressional authority under the Patent Clause
is constitutionally limited in another way. "Innovation, advancement, and things
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of . . .useful
Arts."' The same point was made in The Telephone Cases:2 "[Ilt is only useful
arts-arts which may be used to advantage-that can be made the subject of a
patent."222
Such statements by the Court indicate two additional constitutional constraints
on patentability. The third constitutional constraint is that a work must involve a
useful applicationof knowledge. For example, laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas are not patentable. To have an invention, one must create a
practical application of laws of nature, natural phenomena, or ideas. This limit dates
back more than one hundred years to Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, where the
Court wrote, "[a]n idea of itself is not patentable; but a new device by which it may
be made practically useful is." 223
In part, this constitutional requirement has been codified as the requirement that
a new invention has to be "useful" in order to be patentable. '4 The observation that
the patent system deals with inventions having practical utility is commonplace, but
it is less understood that this statutory requirement rests on constitutional
requirements.
Important as the "usefulness" statutory requirement is, however, it does not quite
codify the constitutional requirement. Professor Chisum, in his treatise, says that to
comply with the utility requirement,
an invention must meet three tests. First, it must be operable and capable of use.
It must operate to perform the functions and secure the result intended. Second,

217. The quid pro quo requirement may also, in part, underlie the Court's decisions that one cannot claim
too broadly. See infra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
218. In commenting on a draft of this article, Professor Mark Lemley inquired about what this mode of
analysis implied as to copyright law. A complete discussion of this, however, would probably be a suitable subject
The important point is that the Supreme Court has determined that the
for an entire article in and of itself.
constitutional term "Writings," which is the copyright analog to the constitutional term "Discoveries," sets limits
on what kinds of works can be protected by Congress under a copyright statute. See Feist Publications,499 U.S.
at 344-61; see also infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
219. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
8).
220. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl.
221. 126 U.S. 1(1888).
222. Id. at 533.
223. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498,507 (1874); see also Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) ("Even though
a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of the principle may
be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other
inventive concept in its application."); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("If there is to
be invention from such a discovery [of a phenomenon of nature], it must come from the application of the law of
nature to a new and useful end."); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)
("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.").
224. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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it must operate to achieve some minimum human purpose. Third, it must achieve
a human purpose that is not illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy.'

Examples illustrate the point that there are creative works that are "useful," but
which are not patentable. Maps provide useful information and movies entertain
people. New creative maps and movies satisfy the three tests for being "useful," yet
would not be considered to be patentable subject matter. These examples show that
the constitutional requirement that an invention add to the sum of useful knowledge
and promote the progress of useful arts goes beyond a "usefulness" requirement.2 26
This brings us to the fourth constitutional requirement for patentability--that the
invention be within the proper subject matter for the grant of a patent. In everyday
language, one would say that the fourth requirement is that the invention be the
proper "kind" of invention. A new map may be useful, but it is not the right kind of
invention to be the subject of a patent. 2
The quotes above from Graham and the Telephone Cases,228 are instructive as
to this fourth constitutional requirement for patentability. They say that the subject
matter of patents is limited to the "useful arts"" which some courts and commenta'23 °
tors have equated with the "technological arts."

225. 1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.01.
226. For additional comments about the "usefulness" requirement. see infra notes 301-07 and accompanying
text.
227. See, e.g., Flookl 437 U.S. at 593 ("The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented
rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental
.understanding that they are not the kind of 'discoveries' that the statute was designed to protect.") (emphasis
added).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 217-19.
229. Accord Chiappetta, supra note 11, at 128-29 (writing that the Constitution establishes the "outer
boundary" for the patent power of Congress); Samuelson, supra note 195, at 1033 n.24 (writing that the
Constitution constrains patent statutes to promoting the progress of the useful arts, which "is understood to be the
realm of technological and industrial improvements"); Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The
Creation of the PatentAct of1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J.445, 453 (1997) ("The constitutional language that empowered
the Congress to issue patents... obligated the Congress to use that power within certain specific constraints. Thus,
the exclusive right known as a patent could only be given for the purpose of 'promoting the Progress of Science
and useful arts' and it could only be for a 'limited' term. In addition, it could only be given to 'Inventors' for 'their
...
Discoveries."')
Not all commentators agree that the "useful arts" requirement exists constitutionally. See Arthur H.
Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J.PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 5 (1966) (arguing that the
Constitution imposes only a novelty requirement and that cases suggesting other constitutional requirements are
inerror).
230. See, e.g., In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ("[Wlhether appellant's process is a
'statutory' invention depends upon whether it is within the 'technological arts."'); In re Musgrave,
431 F.2d 882,
893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("All that is necessary... to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory 'process' within
35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to
promote the progress of "useful arts."'); I CHtsUM,supra note 7, at 23 of glossary [hereinafter G1-231 (identifying
"technological arts" as being synonymous with "useful arts"). Professor Chiappetta similarly writes that the "useful
arts" involved "technology" or "industrial arts." See Chiappetta, supra note 11. at 129-30.
The PTO states that "[tihe utility of an invention must be within the 'technological arts,"' see Guidelines, 61
Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (1996), and says that "[t]he definition of 'technology' is the 'application of science and
engineering to the development of machines and procedures in order to enhance or improve human conditions, or
at least to improve human efficiency in some respect."' Id. at 7488 n.7 (quoting COMPUTER DICTIONARY 384
(Microsoft Press, 2d ed. 1994)).
One commentator had difficulty accepting Musgrave's point that "technological arts"
and "useful arts" are the
same and that statutory subject matter is limited to them. He noted that if the terms are equated, then "every inquiry
as to the patentability of a computer-implemented invention [would be] a constitutional question." See Maximilian
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The "useful arts" limitation is directly derived from the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, which expressly limits Congress to granting copyrights
and patents for "Writings and Discoveries."2 3' If something is not a "discovery"
within the meaning of the Constitution, it is not the proper subject matter for a
patent. The purpose of patents and copyrights is to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful arts," so a "discovery" must be within the "useful arts."
The importance of Graham and the Telephone Cases is that they remind us of the
constitutional requirements--that patents can only issue to "inventors" for things
that meet the constitutional standard of being "discoveries." These constitutional
terms are each a term of art, and interrelated. One person may invent a new
machine; another may discover a law of nature. If the machine meets the tests for
patentability, the first person would be treated as an "inventor" and the invention
would be a patentable "discovery" within the "useful arts." For the other person, we
attach none of those labels. 2 The law of nature does not fall within the "useful
arts" and, consequently, the discoverer is not an "inventor" nor is the discovery a
"discovery" within the constitutional terms.
Put simply, the subject matter of patents is limited to the "discoveries" which
must be in the "useful arts," and vice versa. One who makes such a discovery is an
"inventor," and one cannot be an "inventor" unless one makes a "discovery."
One must acknowledge that the conventional view is that the Constitution sets
no standards for patentability,23 3 other than that patents can only issue for "limited
times," a restriction that does not concern this article. This conventional view is
probably wrong, just as the analogous view in copyright proved wrong. Until 1991,
the conventional view of copyright law was that the Constitution set no standards
for copyright ability, other than the "limited times" provision. For example, the
conventional view of copyright law was that the standard for "originality" was
solely a statutory one. This view of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution was

R. Peterson, Note, Now You See It. Now You Don't: Was It a Patentable Machine or an Unpatentable
"Algorithm"? On Principleand Expediency in CurrentPatentLaw Doctrines Relating to Computer-Implemented
Inventions, 64 GEO. WASH. L REV. 90, 97 (1995). Apparently, because of this concern, he did not discuss the
matter further. Although he may be uncomfortable with the implications of Musgrave and of the analysis given in
this article, Mr. Peterson correctly identified the fact that the statutory subject matter issue is a constitutional one.
Other commentators have also refered to the same language from Musgrave, but then improperly stated that
this subject matter requirement would be satisfied so long as the claimed subject matter is "useful." See In re
Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting); TOEDT. supra note 11, at §§ 6.02[a], 6.04.
The "subject matter" and "useful" requirements are distinct requirements for patentability. See infra notes 302-07
and accompanying text.
231. U.S. CONS'I'. art.l, § 8, cl. 8.
232. 1 WALKER, ATREATIS ON THE LAw OFPATENTs 23 (6th ed. 1929).
233. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979); see also TOED'r, supra note 11, at § 6.02[c][2]
(arguing that the Supreme Court abandoned a constitutional-based standard in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980)); Seidel, supranote 229, at 5 (arguing that the Constitution imposes only a novelty requirement and
that cases suggesting other constitutional requirements are in error).
Perhaps the best indication of the conventional wisdom is a negative inference based on the articles previously
listed in note 11. If the conventional wisdom was that the Constitution was relevant to the analysis of the
patentability of mathematical algorithm-related and computer-program-related inventions, then one would expect
those articles to contain a discussion of the constitutional issues. The fact that virtually none of the articles does
so indicates that the conventional wisdom does not regard the Constitution as important to the analysis. But see
Cohen, supra note 175, at 1164 (1995) (arguing that the exclusion of mathematical formulae from patentability
is "of constitutional stature"); see also sources cited supra note 229.
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proved wrong in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. ,234
where the Court held that a garden-variety White Pages telephone directory did not
constitute copyrightable expression on the grounds that there was insufficient
originality to qualify such a work as a "writing" and that the creators of the work
could not be considered "authors." 5 The Court expressly used these constitutional
terms and grounded its decision on the Constitution rather than on the statutory
standard of "originality." Feist was a surprising decision because the Court invoked
the Constitution in deciding a copyright case, in spite of a two-hundred-year history
of not doing so.
The constitutional standards addressed in Feist dealt both with the level of
creativity required for a work to be copyrighted and the kinds of works that can be
copyrighted. The analogous standards for patents would be the "inventiveness"
requirement (now codified as the nonobviousness standard in § 103) and the subject
matter requirement (codified in part in § 101). In discussing these requirements,
Feist noted that the constitutional dimensions of the terms "authors" and "writings"
were discussed in the Trade-Mark Cases more than one hundred years earlier.236
The fact that the Supreme Court has infrequently addressed the constitutional
dimensions of copyright (and patent) law does not mean that there are no
constitutional dimensions. As Feist shows, the conventional wisdom about the
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution may well be wrong. And, in fact,
the Court is willing and able to invoke the Constitution to decide cases under the
Patent and Copyright Clause despite years of not doing so.
D.

"Useful Arts" and "Discoveries" Are Terms ofArt; The "Useful Arts" Are
Limited to CertainFields of Creativity
What do the terms "useful arts" and "discoveries" mean?" It is important that
these terms are not defined in the Constitution. It is difficult to imagine a literalist
interpretation of the phrase "useful arts." More importantly, however, it seems that
a literalist meaning of the word "discoveries" was not intended.237
The "useful arts," from a constitutional perspective, are limited to certain fields
of creativity. Professor Chisum, in his treatise, writes that "useful arts is synony234. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
235. See id. at 363-64.
236. The FeistCourt wrote:
[O]riginality is a constitutional requirement. . . . In two decisions from the late 19th
Century-The Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-GilesLithographic Co. v. Sarony--this Court
defined the crucial terms "authors" and "writings." In so doing, the Court made it unmistakably
clear that these terms presuppose a degree of originality.
In The Trade-Mark Cases, the court addressed the constitutional scope of "writings." For
a particular work to be classified "under the head of writings of authors," the Court determined,
"originality is required." The Court explained that originality requires independent creation plus
a modicum of creativity: "[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been,
to include original designs for engraving, prints, etc., it is only such as are original,and are
founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are thefruits
of intellectual labor,embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like."
Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (quoting the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)) (citations omitted).
237. One might "discover" a naturally-occurring organism or a law of nature, but these are not the kind of
"discoveries" meant by the Constitution. Discoveries are limited to applications of natural phenomena
or laws of
nature. See discussion infra Parts VLE-F.
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mous with the contemporary concept of technological arts and is contrasted with
'Science,' the promotion of which is the object of the copyright system., 23 Thus,
if one writes a new book or composes a new song, one would obtain a copyright for
this work, yet no one would imagine obtaining a patent for the work. Such works
are outside the subject matter of patents. This and other such excluded fields will
be discussed below.
Other authors have endeavored to explain what fields are within the subject of
the "useful arts." Edward Walterscheid explained that the phrase "useful arts" in the
Constitution meant "helpful or valuable trades." 9 According to Pamela Samuelson,
"'useful Arts' is understood to be the realm of technological and industrial
improvements."' Arthur H. Seidel wrote that "useful arts" refers to "useful trades,"
which "will include many mundane fields, like household chores, building trades,
and keeping business data."" Vincent Chiappetta characterizes the "useful arts" as
"limited to the practical application of knowledge and learning to the industrial arts,
that is to the creation of specific tools, products and procedures for performing
activities such as the creation of new things, arrangements of things or relationships
between things. ' ' 2
We can gain a sense of the original scope of the "useful arts" by looking at the
types of things for which patents were first issued. Individuals filed eighteen patent
petitions with the First Congress in 1789-90 for "inventions relating to propelling
boats, steamboats, steam engines, determining longitude, making nails, threshing
and reaping grain, deepening docks, revolution and vibration counters, making
buttons, mills, and, marking a species of inventor which seems to be always with
us, lightning proof umbrellas."" 3
Indeed, even prior to the first United States patent act, there are indications of the
kinds of subject matter that were thought of as being within the "useful arts." For
example, in addressing Congress on January 8, 1790, President George Washington
spoke of the need for a patent act in order to advance "agriculture, commerce, and
manufactur[ing]."' Congress concurred, with the House replying, "We concur with

238. 1 CHIsUM, supranote 7, at GI-23; accordIn re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman,
J., dissenting); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A.
1972); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The Guidelines provide that "[t]he utility of an
invention must be within the 'technological' arts." See Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (1996). 'Ilie definition
of 'technology' is the 'application of science and engineering to the development of machines and procedures in
order to enhance or improve human conditions, or at least to improve human efficiency in some respect."' Id. at
7488 n.7 (quoting COMpuTER DICTIONARY 384 (Microsoft Press, 2d ed. 1994).
239. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Backgroundand
Origin of the IntellectualProperty Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L 1, 52 (1994).
240. Samuelson, supra note 195, at 1033 n.24.
241. Seidel, supra note 229, at 13.
242. Chiappetta, supranote 11, at 129.
243. See P. J. Federico, The PatentAct of 1790, in Outline of the History of the United States PatentOffice,
J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y (July 1936) 59, 60. [EDITOR's NOTE: While this journal is normally consecutively paginated,
this citation refers to the July 1936 special centennial issue entitled "Outline of the History of the United States
Patent Office," in which Federico's work appears on page 59. This issue, although bound in Volume 18, is not
consecutively paginated.]
244. See P. J. Federico, The FirstPatentAct, 14 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 237, 243 (1932) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 970 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
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you in the sentiment that agriculture, commerce, and manufactur[ing], are entitled
to legislative protection," and the Senate replying in similar language.' 5
E. PatentableSubject Matter Expands to Include New Technologies
While George Washington spoke of patentable subject matter in terms of
"agriculture, commerce, and manufactur[ing]," ' patentable subject matter should
not be limited to those areas. The goal of the patent system is to promote the public
welfare by encouraging inventions in areas of technological development. To limit
those areas to known areas is counter to the underlying goals of the patent system.
Telephony, electronics, nuclear technologies, biotechnologies, and computers were
unknown in the eighteenth century, yet we want to encourage innovation in these
areas. Therefore, the subject matter of patents can and should expand to include
these new areas.' 7
In today's world, information processing and computer technologies are a major
portion of the economy. There is no reason why the constitutional terms "discoveries" and "inventors" should not be expanded to include significant portions of these
areas.
Copyright law has witnessed an analogous expansion of subject matter. The first
copyright act allowed copyrights for books, maps, and charts.' Copyright has since
expanded to include musical works, movies, choreographic works, sculpture,
engravings, prints, advertising, code books, computer programs, and architectural
works. There does not seem to be any constitutional impediment to including all of
these kinds of works within the constitutional term "writings. ' 249 Similarly, the
constitutional term "discoveries" should be given wide scope.
F.

Laws of Nature, NaturalPhenomenon, and Abstract Ideas Are Not
PatentableSubject Matter
The scope of patentable "discoveries" and the "useful arts" is large and growing,
but there are limits. The Supreme Court has provided guidance in understanding
these constitutional limits. On many occasions the Court has stated that patents
cannot issue for laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.2"' Rather, the
"useful arts" involve solving technological problems. Discoveries of laws of nature
and natural phenomena may be valuable and useful, but they are not the kind of

245. See id. at 243-44 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1089 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
246. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980) (rejecting the idea that the patent
statute should be limited unless Congress explicitly extended it into new technological areas).
248. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; see also Denise R. Polivy, Feist Applied: Imagination
Protects, but Perspiration Persists-The Bases of Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations, 8 FORDHAM
INTEIL. PRoP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 773, 779 (1998).
249. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.. 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (allowing protection for
colored lithograph advertising posters).
250. See supra note 201.
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discoveries for which patents can issue.25' Similarly, abstract ideas may be
important and useful, but they are not the kind of things for which patents can issue.
Two comments about this limitation are worth making. First, this shows that the
word "discoveries" in the Constitution is a term of art. In its common, ordinary
meaning, it would appear that one who discovered a law of nature or a "naturally
occurring" substance might be within the scope of patentable subject matter. The
Court, however, has indicated that this ordinary meaning is not intended.252 And,
since "discoveries" and "useful arts" are integrally related concepts, one must infer
that "useful arts" is also a term of art. 53
Second, it is hard to know whether the Court correctly interpreted the word
"discoveries" in the Constitution, either on linguistic or on policy grounds. Even at
the time the Constitution was written, the meaning of "discover" included finding
new natural phenomena,' so the Court's interpretation does not seem to be based
on the common meaning of the word at the time the Constitution was written.
Trying to justify the Court's interpretation on policy grounds is equally
problematic. The issue of what kinds of inventions are desirable and the appropriate
kinds and amounts of stimuli needed to encourage new invention is challenging. 255
Arguably, these may be the kinds of issues that Congress could investigate through
the legislative process. After such an investigation, Congress might decide, for
example, that more research and discoveries of naturally-occurring chemicals from
plants is needed in order to be able to investigate their pharmacological properties.
Congress, therefore, might wish to include naturally-occurring chemicals from
plants within patentable subject matter.256 Then, one would assume that the
Supreme Court would defer to such congressional investigation and legislation
passed in response to such an investigation. What is interesting is that the Court
seems to have foreclosed this approach through its pronouncements that laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.257

251. See, e.g., Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) ("The rule that the discovery of a law of nature

cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomenon [sic] are not processes, but rather on the more
fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of 'discoveries' that the statute was designed to protect.").
The mathematical equation e=mc', showing the relationship between energy and matter is one example of a law

of nature. The existence of statistical correlations between a particular biological test and a particular genetic or
biological condition is another example of a law of nature. These are not patentable subject matter.
252. See supra note 196.
253. Section 101 of the Patent Act also uses the word "discovers." See supra note 4. A literal interpretation

of § 101 would indicate that someone who discovered a new naturally-occurring chemical would pass the subject
matter test. This literal interpretation is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's statements that natural phenomena are
not patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
254. m OXFORD ENGLISH DICrONARY 431-32 (1933).
255. Presumably, this would entail considerable empirical research and careful mathematical modeling.
256. Alternatively, Congress might reach the opposite conclusion. Were we to give a patent monopoly to one
who discovers a new organism or naturally-occurring substance, others might hesitate to undertake research to
determine whether that organism or substance could be put to practical use until the first monopoly expired. This
might well delay finding applications of the new organism or substance.
Thus, Congress could decide that, while the existing system may lead to less investment in finding new
organisms or substances, it is likely to lead to more rapid exploitation of such things, and to their exploitation in
a variety of fields, once they are found. Given a choice between these two alternatives, Congress could decide to
limit the patent monopoly to those who show how such organisms or substances can be used to solve problems
which confront humans.
257. It would be interesting to see what would happen if Congress engaged in serious fact-finding and

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 29

G.

Purely MathematicalAlgorithms and CalculationsAre Not Patentable
Subject Matter
Purely mathematical algorithms provide one illustration of the theory that
abstract ideas are not patentable. By a purely mathematical algorithm, we mean a
mathematical calculation done for its own sake and divorced from any utilitarian
process."5 Such algorithms should be distinguished from a mathematical algorithm
which is part of a utilitarian process. The former falls on the abstract idea side of
the line and is not proper patentable subject matter; the latter falls on the utilitarian
side of the line and should be treated as patentable subject matter.
An example of a purely mathematical algorithm is that of the patent claim in
Benson.' 9 The claim was for a process which could convert binary coded decimal
numbers into pure binary numbers. 2' That is a purely mathematical algorithm. 2"
It is not part of a utilitarian process. 2' The Court stated, "It is conceded that one
may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the formula
for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case." 3
An example of a mathematical calculation which was part of a utilitarian process
is that of the patent claim in Diehr.26" The claim was for a process of molding
rubber products in which the cure time was calculated using the Arrhenius

decided that natural phenomena should be included within patentable subject matter in order to stimulate mor pure
scientific research. Such fact-finding and legislation would squarely present the issue of whether the word
"discoveries" has the constitutional meaning given it by the Court.
Congress has not yet done this. No fact-finding along these lines was done by Congress when it passed the
present Patent Act in the 1950s. Notwithstanding the statement in Committee Reports that statutory subject matter
should "include anything under the sun that is made by man," there is no indication that Congress even considered,
much less desired to overrule, the numerous Supreme Court decisions stating that abstract ideas, natural
phenomena, and laws of nature are not patentable subject matter. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
Copyright law presents an analogous problem. In FeistPublications,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340

(199 1),
the Supreme Court decided that the constitutional term "Writings" (which is the copyright term that is
equivalent to the patent term "Discoveries" in the Copyright and Patent Clause) established a minimum level of
originality which had to be met for a work to be copyrightable. This decision implies that some kinds of databases
will not be copyrightable. Congress is currently engaged in considering whether those kinds of databases (as well
as databases which are already protected by copyright) need some form of protection from being copied. Rather
than presenting a direct challenge to the Court's interpretation of the Copyright and Patent Clause of the
Constitution, Congress is apparently tying to draft legislation which would protect databases under the Commerce
Clause or some other part of the Constitution. The fact that Congress is not directly challenging the Court in this
copyright context lends further support to the point that Congress did not try
to directly challenge the Court when
it passed the Patent Act of 1952.
258. This definition becomes important later. See infra text accompanying note 294.
259. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For a more in-depth discussion of Benson, see supra text
accompanying notes 17-32.
260. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 74.
261. See id. at 65, 71-72.
262. In commenting on a draft of this article, Professor Lemnley wrote that this algorithm has applications in
computer science. Assuming that it does, and further assuming that the computer science involved can be applied
to some useful human purpose, the statement in the text is incorrect and this algorithm is not a proper example of
a purely mathematical algorithm. With those assumptions, perhaps the Supreme Court didn't seem to be aware of
such practical applications when it wrote its opinion.
263. Id. at 71; see also In re Waldbaunm, 559 F.2d 611, 616 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (rejecting mathematical
algorithm claims as being "abstract and sweeping").
264. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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equation. 65 This was not simply calculating numbers for their own sake. Rather, it
was calculating numbers in order to know when the molded rubber product was
properly cured, with the precise kind of calculation done as part of an industrial
process.2 Therefore, the industrial process is patentable subject matter. 7
Between the extremes of Benson and Diehrare many other inventions involving
mathematical algorithms. Below, we will return to the issue of whether mathematical algorithms can be patentable subject matter.
H. Claiming Too Broadly May Exceed PatentableSubject Matter
O'Reilly v. Morse' illustrates another category of subject matter which is not
patentable. In Morse, several of Samuel Morse's claims relating to telegraphy were
allowed, but the Supreme Court held that Morse's eighth claim was not
patentable. 69 That eighth claim was for "the use of the motive power of the electric
or galvanic current,... call[ed] electromagnetism, however developed for marking
or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances. 27
The Court reasoned:
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery
the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know, some future inventor,
in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at
a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current without using any part of
the process or combination set forth in the plaintiffs specification. His
invention may be less complicated-less liable to get out of order-less
expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet, if it is covered by this
patent, the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it, without
the permission of this patentee."'
The Court's analysis indicates that Morse's claim was too broad. He was
claiming more than he invented. Instead of claiming a particular process or
machinery to accomplish some result, he was claiming an effect no matter what
process or machines were used. Such a claim was not patentable. 2n
At least two constitutional theories seem to underlie the doctrine set forth in
O'Reilly v. Morse. One is that the claim in Morse falls into the category of a claim
for an abstract idea rather than a specific application of that idea. As such, it is not
patentable subject matter.273
A second constitutional theory is that the breadth of the claim offends the
constitutional requirement that there be an appropriate quid pro quo of public
benefit in exchange for the grant of the patent. If a patent were to issue for a claim
265. See id. at 177.
266. See id. at 191-92.
267. See id.at 192-93.
268. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
269. See id at 124.
270. See id. at ll2.
271. Id.at68.
272. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1. 534 (1888) (commenting on Morse).
273. Professor Chisum argues that claims of undue breadth probably also violate the statutory requirement
of enabling disclosure. See Donald S. Chisum,The PatentabilityofAlgorithns, 47 U. Prrr. L REV. 959,982 &
n.83 (1986). Accord,Stem, An Attempt to Rationalize, supra note 11, at 190.
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this broad, the private benefit to the patentee would be so great that it would dwarf
the public benefit from the disclosure of the invention. The Court may be implying
that, while there is great latitude in the quid pro quo that is permissible under the
patent system, there are limits, and a patent claim of this breadth exceeds those
constitutional limits.274 It should be noted, however, that this doctrine has rarely
been applied. Indeed, in the Telephone Cases,2" a claim of almost equal breadth
was allowed. 6
Patent attorneys are trained to draft some of their claims quite broadly. Morse
teaches that there is a line beyond which a claim will fail because it is too broad and
too abstract. 277 One cannot specify where that line is, requiring that cases be decided
on their own facts and merits.278
FurtherReflections on MathematicalAlgorithms: It is Time to Limit or
Reverse Flook
As discussed above,279 purely mathematical algorithms-i.e., mathematical
calculations divorced from any practical application--are treated as if they are
abstract ideas and thus not patentable subject matter because they are not part of the
"useful arts." On the other hand, utilitarian processes, such as molding rubber
products, are patentable subject matter even though they contain mathematical
calculations.
The only Supreme Court decision that falls "in-between" these two extremes is
Parker v. Flook,8 ° in which the Court held that a process for updating an alarm
limit for use in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons was not patentable subject
matter."' Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Flook agreed that mathematical formulas and purely mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter,
but they disagreed on whether Flook involved such a claim.282 The three dissenting
Justices thought that the process in Flook was a utilitarian process within patentable
subject matter and that the mathematical algorithm was just one step in that
process.283
The majority held that the method claimed would amount to a patent on the
algorithm. 2 4 For the majority, the claim in Flook looked like a pure mathematical
I.

274. The author has previously written about the quid pro quo permissible under the copyright system. See
Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L REV. 1 (1995); Robert
A. Kreiss, Copyright Fair Use of Standardized Tests, 48 RuTGERS L REV. 1043 (1996).
275. 126U.S. 1(1888).
276. See generally 1 CHISUM, supra note 7,§ 1.03[2][c].
277. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 68 (1853).
278. Copyright law has long faced the same issue. Expression is copyrightable, but ideas are not. The line
between the two cannot be specified, yet courts have successfully dealt with this issue on a case-by-case basis for
many years.
279. See supra Part VLG.
280. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
281. See id.at 594-95.
282. Compare id. at 594-95 with id. at 598-99. For a more in-depth discussion of Flook, see supra text
accompanying notes 33-46.
283. See id. at 598-99.
284. See iad.at 593-94.
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algorithm claim.285 The Court stated that mathematical calculations should be
treated as "basic tools of scientific and technological work" and "treated as though
it were a familiar part of the prior art." The Court repeated the idea that scientific
truths or phenomena of nature are not patentable; one can only patent subject matter
which involves applications of such things." 7
The different perspectives shown by the majority and the dissent in Flook are
echoed today by the different perspectives of the judges on the Federal Circuit. 28 8
Flook involved the calculation of numbers-alarm limits-and some judges on the
Federal Circuit read the Supreme Court decisions to preclude any patent where the
claim amounts to the use of a mathematical algorithm or formula in order to
calculate a number or numbers. Other judges on the Federal Circuit believe that if
the numbers so calculated are not just abstract numbers, but, instead, represent realworld conditions or things, then the claims are not purely mathematical
algorithms. 9 These judges interpret the Supreme Court decisions to say that "there
are three categories of subject matter for which one cannot obtain patent protection,
namely 'laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas."' 2 Mathematical
algorithms do not represent a fourth category of excluded matter. Instead, the only
mathematical algorithm-related inventions that are not patentable subject matter are
the equivalent of abstract ideas, and these are the purely mathematical algorithm
claims.29 These judges seemingly agree with the dissenters in Flook' and may
believe that the Supreme Court today will either limit Flook to its facts, as the outer
limit of the idea that purely mathematical calculations are not patentable subject
matter, or will overrule Flook.293

285. In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the Court reiterated that Flook just involved claims for a
method to compute a number. See id at 186.
286. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591-92.
287. See id. at 584.
288. See supra notes 83-105, 112-37, and accompanying text.
289. In reality, the views of the judges on the Federal Circuit do not fit neatly into two distinct groups. See,
e.g., Ruben Bains, Note, A Comparison of the PTO's Computer-Implemented Guidelines with the Current Case
Law, 5 TEX. INTELL PROP. LJ. 27, 29-30 (1996); Ronald S. Laurie & Joseph K. Siino, A Bridge Over Troubled
Waters? Software Patentability and the PTO's Proposed Guidelines (Part 1), COMPUTrm LAWYER Sept. 1995 at
6; Richard H. Stem, Solving the Algorithm Conundrum: After 1994 in the Federal Circuit Patent Law Needs a
RadicalAlgorithmectomy, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 167, 206-08 (1994). While this article suggests that there are two groups,
it does so for purposes of simplicity in order to focus on the larger issues.
290. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
185 (1981)).
291. See id., 33 F.3d at 1543.
292. See generally Flook, 437 U.S. at 598-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
293. Some people believe that Diamond v. Diehr,450 U.S. 175 (1981), has already overruled Flook. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text; infra note 294.
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What did the Supreme Court mean in Flook? While the issue is far from clear,294
it is plausible to believe that the Supreme Court in Flook was signaling that any
claim which amounts to the use of a mathematical algorithm or formula in order to
calculate a number or numbers is not patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court
seemingly adopted this view of Flook in Diehr. In Diehr,the Court stated that the
application in Flook sought to protect a formula for computing an alarm limit-"a
number."'29 This was contrasted to the claims in Diehr, which the Court characterized as a claim directed to a process for curing rubber. It therefore appears as if
Benson, Flook, and Diehrproscribe a patent where the claim amounts to the use of
a mathematical algorithm or formula in order to calculate a number or numbers.
Such an interpretation would mean that Grams was properly decided and the
district court decision in State Street should have been affirmed; it means that
Arrhythmia, Alappat, and the Federal Circuit's State Street decision are inconsistent
with the Supreme Court decisions to date. In each of those cases, the patent claims
are for mathematical algorithms that calculate numbers, or for machinery that does
the calculation. The fact that numbers so calculated represent real-world conditions
or things would not seem to be sufficient to save the claim, as shown by Flook.
Thus, the group of Federal Circuit judges who follow this interpretation of the
Supreme Court decisions is more accurate in its reading.
Notwithstanding this reading of existing Supreme Court cases, this article urges
the Supreme Court to overrule Flook and move in the direction taken by the Flook
dissenters and the judges on the Federal Circuit who have apparently decided that
they need not follow Flook.296 In its next decision, the Court should decide that
claims involving mathematical calculations will generally be treated as patentable
subject matter if those numbers are part of technological processes and represent
real-world phenomena. The only exception would be that claims drawn to purely
mathematical algorithms would remain outside the boundaries of patentable subject
matter.297

294. It is unclear because Flook indicates that one should proceed as if the algorithm were already known.
See Flook, 437 U.S. at 591-92. "[O]nce that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application,
considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention." Id. at 594. Although disclaimed by the Court, this
language seems more appropriate in a discussion of novelty under § 102 or obviousness under § 103.
Other commentators focus on different aspects of the Supreme Court decisions in showing a lack of clarity.
Some, for example, have argued that Benson and Flook were part of an early era of Supreme Court decisions and
that the Court abandoned those cases in deciding Chakrabarnyand Diehr.See, e.g., TOEDT, supra note 227, at
§ 6.02; Chisum, supra note 273. For these authors, no reconciliation of the cases is necessary, as Flook can be
considered to be overruled in fact if not in word.
Some judges on the Federal Circuit have also argued that Flook has been superseded by the analysis in Diehr.
See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Diehr court "turned away from the Benson algorithm nile"); cf Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d
at 1057 n.4 (Newman, J., opinion of the court) (noting that "it appears to be generally agreed that [Benson, Flook,
and Diehr] represent evolving views of the Court, and that the reasoning in Diehrnot only elaborated on, but in
part superseded, that of Benson and Flook").
Because the Diehrdecision distinguishes Flookrather than expressly overruling it, this article proceeds on the
assumption that Flook remains good law.
295. See Diehr,450 U.S. at 186.
296. As noted previously, some people believe that the Supreme Court has already done this. See supra note
61 and accompanying text.
297. See supra text accompanying note 258.
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Such an interpretation would greatly reduce the applicability of the doctrine that
purely mathematical algorithms are like abstract ideas and cannot be patented. This
is because patent attorneys drafting patent claims will almost always be able to draft
a claim so that the numerical calculations involved have real-world meaning.
There are several reasons for urging the Court to either overrule Flook or
narrowly limit it to its facts. First, patents can stimulate the further development and
use of computers to produce applications of great benefit to humans. Some of these
applications may involve replacing manual labor with machine labor. Other
applications may involve doing things that would have been impossible with manual
calculation methods. For example, air traffic controllers use computers to determine
the location and speed of airplanes so that more flights can occupy a given amount
of air space safely. Doctors can use computers to do real-time analyses of a patient's
condition so that medical treatment can be more timely and more effective. MRI
machines use computers to create pictures of cross-sections of a person in order to
locate and diagnose abnormal conditions. Geologists can use computers to analyze
seismograms in order to locate commercially valuable mineral or petroleum
deposits. Accountants can use computers to do daily calculations of assets and
liabilities of a company or to do up-to-the-minute calculations of account balances.
Insurance companies can use computers to detect insurance fraud by doing
sophisticated cross-checking of insurance claim records. The examples could be
multiplied. These examples involve very practical uses of computers and are the
kind of things that the patent system should encourage. It seems counter-productive
to leave these things outside the subject matter of patents simply because they are
primarily just mathematical calculations.
Second, this approach appears to be more consistent with the Court's treatment
of the other categories of excluded subject matter-laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas. For example, the Court has stated that applications
of laws of nature and naturalphenomena within the technological arts are treated
as patentable subject matter even though the natural law or natural phenomenon
would not be.298 Mathematical algorithms should be treated similarly; applications
of mathematical algorithms within the technological arts should be considered
patentable subject matter even though the pure mathematical algorithm would not
be. In other words, the standard applied should be the same for laws of nature,
natural phenomena, abstract ideas, and mathematical algorithms.
Consistent application of this standard would indicate that a claim to the use of
a mathematical algorithm should not be barred, even if the claim involves the use
of an algorithm to calculate a number or numbers, so long as the claim is directed
to a real-world application.2 This article agrees with the dissenters in Flook that

298. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980).
299. See Chiappetta, supra note 11, at 154 passim. Professor Dennis Kaijala has argued that, while a
mathematical algorithm that calculates numerical results from numerical inputs might sometimes be rejected as
nonstatutory subject matter on the grounds that it is abstract theory, a computer program implementing that
algorithm should be treated as patentable subject matter and the inquiry as to patentability should focus on issues
of novelty and nonobviousness. See Karjala,supra note 11, at 60-61. He contends that the computer program
involves applications of laws of nature just as other technological processes do and it therefore should be accorded
the same treatment in patent law that other applications of laws of nature receive. Program object codes on a
diskette represent physical signals (high or low voltages or magnetic field strengths), not ones or zeros that may
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the claims in that case used the algorithm as one step in a method that was proper
subject matter.
Third, experience over the past twenty-five years has shown that it is difficult to
find a line which distinguishes those mathematical algorithm-related claims which
are patentable from those which are not. Drawing the line between "purely"
mathematical algorithms and algorithms which are part of utilitarian processes will
have its own problems, but it may be a much more tractable problem than the
present one.
Fourth, as a practical matter, we are almost there already. Recent decisions of the
PTO and the Federal Circuit have allowed quite a few such patents and it will be

difficult to undo this fact of life.3' 0

J. The "Useful Arts" Do Not Include Everything that Is Useful

In determining the scope of the constitutional phrase, "useful arts," we should not
fall into the trap of thinking that they comprise all that is useful.3 ' A map is useful
in helping one go from point A to point B; a toy may be useful in keeping a child
occupied or entertained; a book may contain a great deal of useful information. Yet
none of these items would be considered to be within the "useful arts" as that term
is used in the Constitution. Instead, those items would be considered to be within
the ambit of copyrightable subject matter.
The concept of "usefulness," as that word is used ordinarily, does not distinguish
patentable subject matter from copyrightable subject matter. Therefore, a different
boundary must be used to distinguish copyrights from patents and to help define
"useful arts."
K. The "Useful Arts" Subject Matter Requirement Is Distinctfrom the
Requirement that an Invention Be "Useful"

Similarly, the issue of patentable subject matter is different from the statutory
requirement that an invention be "useful."' Although this requirement may overlap
to some extent with the subject matter requirement, they are distinct
requirements.'

be readable by humans. These physical signals may be used by the computer to produce other physical signals. The
operations of the computer in doing this are those which the computer is forced to do by the laws of nature. For
Karjala, computer programs involve applications of laws of nature and the subject matter issue should never have
arisen. See id. at 63-65.
Professor Julie Cohen has also urged that more attention be placed on §§ 102 and 103 issues. See Cohen, supra
note 175, at 1168-81.
300. See, for example, the patents listed in Stephen D. Kahn & Leslie Spencer, PTO's New Training
Materialsfor Examination of Computer-Related Applications Complete a Year of SignificantDevelopments for
Patentsand FinancialServices, J.PROPRIETARY RTS. Dec. 1998, at 2.
301. See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,295 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that "a
statutory 'process' is limited only in that it must be technologically useful"); TOEDr, supra note 11, at § 6.04
(arguing that the sole test for statutory subject matter should be whether the claimed subject matter is "useful").
302. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
303. Cf.TOEDT, supra note 11, at § 6.04 (arguing that the sole test for statutory subject matter should be
whether the claimed subject matter is "useful").
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Professor Chisum, in his treatise, says that to comply with the utility requirement,
an invention must meet three tests. First, it must be operable and capable of use.
It must operate to perform the functions and secure the result intended. Second,
it must operate to achieve some minimum human purpose. Third, it must achieve
a human purpose that is not illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy.' 4
Some of these requirements trace back to Justice Story's decision in Lowell v.
Lewis.' As this article has previously noted, the "usefulness" requirement is
constitutionally mandated.3 s
The Supreme Court has stated that laws of nature are not patentable subject
matter. For example, if Einstein had attempted to patent the formula e=mc2 , it
would have been rejected as lacking patentable subject matter. In addition, the PTO
also could have rejected this claim on the grounds of lack of utility-there is no
human purpose served by this information. This indicates that there is some overlap
between these statutory requirements.
Easy examples involving laws of nature and natural phenomena show, however,
that the subject matter and utility requirements each have areas not covered by the
other. For example, gravity is another law of nature, hence barred for lack of
patentable subject matter, but gravity has many human uses (for example, in a
guillotine or a grandfather clock whose mechanism involves a falling weight to
make the wheels turn), so it would not be barred for lack of utility.
Chemical compounds also provide good examples. If a chemical compound is
derived from a plant, animal, or bacterium, it might fail the subject matter test
because it is a phenomenon of nature. If there are no known human uses, the
compound would also fail the utility test.
For a compound found in a plant or animal or bacterium, a purified form of the
compound would pass the subject matter test (the pure form is not a phenomenon
of nature), but still fail the utility test if there are no known human uses. If a
chemical compound is not found in nature, it would be proper subject matter (a
composition of matter), but its ability to pass the utility requirement would depend
upon whether human uses have been found.
These examples show that there are things which are useful but not subject
matter (gravity), things which are subject matter but not useful (purified chemical
compositions from plants or animals with no known uses), and things which are
neither subject matter nor useful (e=mc2 and naturally occurring chemical
compounds with no known uses). For this reason, the analysis of patentable subject
matter has to be done separately from that of the utility requirement.'

304. 1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.01.
305. 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
306. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
307. The Guidelines confuse and conflate these two requirements.
[A] complete disclosure should contain some indication of the practical application for the
claimed invention, i.e., why the applicant believes the claimed invention is useful.
The utility of an invention must be within the "technological" arts. A computer-related
invention is within the technological arts. A practical application of a computer-related
invention is statutory subject matter. This requirement can be discerned from the variously
phrased prohibitions against the patenting of abstract ideas, laws of nature or natural
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L. Generally, PatentableSubject Matter Is Distinctfrom Copyrightable Subject
Matter
It is generally understood that patentable subject matter is distinct from
copyrightable subject matter.3 8 Although the Constitution does not require this
distinction, °9 it can be traced back to the Constitution.
The Constitution contains a grant of authority for Congress to enact copyright
legislation and patent legislation.
While it is contained in a single clause,31 ° there
31
provisions:
distinct
two
are
[(a) (for patents)] The Congress shall have Power...
Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
exclusive Right to their... Discoveries.1
[(b) (for copyrights)] The Congress shall have Power...
Progress of Science .... by securing for limited Times to
exclusive Right to their... Writings ....

To promote the
...
Inventors the
To promote the
Authors ...the

Each provision is a distinct grant of authority and has distinct subject matter. The
Constitution speaks of "useful Arts," "Inventors," and "Discoveries" when it refers

phenomena. An invention that has a practical application in the technological arts satisfies the
utility requirement.
The applicant is in the best position to explain why an invention is believed to be useful.
Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479-80 (1996).
This quotation shows that the FO has confused the utility and subject matter requirements. References to the
"technological arts" (which the FIO equates with the "useful arts") and to "abstract ideas, laws of nature or natural
phenomena" are references that are relevant to the analysis of patentable subject matter. References to an invention
being "useful" and to "the utility requirement" are references to a different issue entirely-that of whether the
invention is useful.
Others have also confused "technological arts" with "usefulness." See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (equating In re Musgrave's statement that patentable subject matter must
be within the "technological arts" as a requirement that the subject matter of the claim be "useful").
308. Professor Chisum writes, "Useful Arts is synonymous with the contemporary concept of technological
arts and is contrasted with 'Science' the promotion of which is the object of the copyright system." 1 CHISUM,
supra note 7, at GI-23; see also BEutNE STEDMAN, PATENTS 6 (1939) ("There is a wide distinction between a patent
and a copyright."); Lloyd L Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L REV. 1149, 1180 (1998)

("[Tlhe essential distinction [between copyright and patent] had been between books, broadly conceived, and
machines.").
The distinction drawn here is between utility patents and copyrights. Design patents, in which protection is
given to the ornamental appearance of an object, were arbitrarily placed in the patent statute and are administered
by the PTO, but have a subject matter which is more closely allied to copyrights.
309. The Constitution permits, but does not require, either a patent or copyright statute. Congress has placed
protecting ornamental designs within the Patent Act as design patents rather than within the Copyright Act, and
nothing in the Constitution suggests that this was impermissible. Likewise, nothing in the Constitution suggests
that Congress would be prevented from replacing the present Copyright and Patent Acts with a unified system in
which all creative works are subject to an administrative determination of their worthiness for protection. Indeed,
Congress placed the set of instructions in computer programs within the Copyright Act notwithstanding the fact
that such instruction sets are the kind of utilitarian works we customarily associate with the patent system.
310. See supra text accompanying note 204.
311. Others have noted that this is the appropriate manner to read the clause. See, e.g., I CHISUM, supra note
7, at 3 of the overview section [hereinafter § OV-3]; Walterscheid, supra note 239, at 51; Weinreb, supra note 308,
at 1181 n.125.
312. U.S. CONsT.art. I,§ 8, cl. 8.
313. Id.
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to patentable subject matter.314 When referring to copyrightable subject matter, the
3'15
Constitution speaks of "Science," "Authors," and "Writings."
Therefore, patentable subject matter should be distinguished from copyrightable
3 1 6 If
subject matter unless there is a clear congressional indication otherwise.
someone creates a new kind of ceramic material, we would expect her to apply for
a patent on that material and we would not allow her to obtain a copyright on that
material. On the other hand, if someone creates a new musical composition, we
would expect him to obtain a copyright on that work and would not allow him to
obtain a patent for it.317
The reason for this is rooted in history and our common understanding of the
differences between copyright and patent. In general, copyright has to do with
conveying information, entertaining, and portraying appearances. Patent, in
contrast, has to do with utilitarian functionality."' When the Constitution was
written, the writers of that document distinguished between copyright and patent
along these lines and used different sets of words to describe these different
subjects.319 This is corroborated by looking at the historical record. Early patents
3
dealt with a variety of machinery and other technological products and processes. 2°
The first copyright statute limited protection to maps, charts, and books-all
nonfunctional works. 321
In copyright cases, courts have attempted to maintain a distinction between the
functional aspects of a work and the nonfunctional aspects. This distinction can be
traced back at least as far as Baker v. Selden.32
In Baker, the Supreme Court held that a person who used a system of bookkeeping did not infringe the copyright held by the person who had first described the
system. 323 The system involved the use of ruled lines and headings and the accused

314.
315.
316.
317.

See id.
See id.
See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
Some works, such as lamp bases and computer programs, may combine copyrightable subject matter

and patentable subject matter. Copyright law attempts to distinguish the portions of such works which represent

infra note
copyrightable subject matter from the portions which are within the realm of the patent system. See, e.g.,
318.

318. Copyright law attempts to capture the flavor of the distinction between copyrights and patents in
determining the copyrightable aspects of some works which combine copyrightable subject matter and patentable
subject matter. The Copyright Act defines a "useful article" as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
For such an article, copyright protects:
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from and are capable of existing independently of,the utilitarian aspects of the article.
319. Professor Chisum agrees. He writes, "Useful Arts is synonymous with the contemporary concept of
technological arts and is contrasted with 'Science' the promotion of which is the object of the copyright system."
I CHISUM, supra note 7,at GI-23.
320. See supra text accompanying note 243.
321. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
322. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Unless otherwise stated, the facts that follow are paraphrased from Baker,101 U.S.
at 99-101, and refer to this citation.
at 104.
323. See id.
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person had used essentially the same kind of lines and headings. The Court held that
the copyright on the book only covered the explanation of the bookkeeping system;
it did not prevent anyone from using the system. 32 The court gave examples of
books concerning the composition and use of medicines, or on the construction and
use of ploughs, or watches, or chums. From all of these, the Court deduced the
general principle:
But the principle is the same in all. The description of the art in a book, though
entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to
the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use.
The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it
can be secured at all, by letters-patent. 3
In other copyright cases, other courts have made the same observations of the
difference between copyrights and patents. For example, in Bateman v. Mnemonics,
Inc.,326 the Eleventh Circuit, in dictum, wrote:
Where a portion of the computer program constitutes an unprotectable method
of operation or process, it is not an expressive part of the work. It is particularly
important to exclude methods of operation and processes from the scope of
copyright in computer programs because much of the contents of computer
programs is patentable. Were we to permit an author to claim copyright
protection for those elements of the work that should be the province of patent
law, we would be undermining the competitive principles that are fundamental
327
to the patent system
The court cited a number of cases, including Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
America, Inc.32 In Atari, the Federal Circuit expressed a similar thouht: "[P]atent
and copyright laws protect distinct aspects of a computer program.3 29 Patent law
"provides protection for the process or method performed by a computer in
accordance with a program," whereas copyright law protects only "the expression
of that process or method. '33 When the Federal Circuit speaks of "the expression
of that process," it should be understood that it is talking about the copyrightable
aspects of the work.33'

324. See id.
325. Id. at 105.
326. 79 F.3d 1532 (11 th Cir. 1996).
327. Id. at 1541 n.21.
328. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
329. Id. at 839.
330. id.
331. The word "expression" is often used in copyright cases in opposition to the word "idea" in order to
suggest the difference between uncopyrightable ideas and copyrightable expressions of ideas. Thus, the word
"expression" is associated in intelectual propaty law with copyrightable material. Perhaps this is why the Federal
Circuit used the term in this quotation. However, it is not clear that the word "expression" distinguishes patents
from copyrights. Both patents and copyrights involve creativity and there is probably no difference in the kind of

creativity required for either of them. By the same token, it seems difficult to imagine why an inventor's
"expression" of a patent idea would be different in kind from an author's "expression" of a copyright idea.
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The Copyright Act also embodies this distinction by limiting protection for
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" to their "form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects. 3 32
Courts in patent cases should follow the lead of the courts in copyright cases and
not allow patentable subject matter to expand to include copyrightable subject
matter unless there is a clear congressional indication otherwise. Determining the
boundary between these two realms is the subject of the next section.
M. "Discoveries'"in the "Useful Arts" Are GenerallyLimited to Things that
Are "Functional"
The concept that best describes the boundary between patentable subject matter
and copyrightable subject matter is that of "functionality." Functionality requires
a careful definition. As we have seen, the concept of "usefulness" is inappropriate
as both copyrighted works and patented works can be useful. Similarly, one cannot
attempt to define patentable subject matter in general terms such as "creativity"
because that term is broad enough to include both copyrighted and patented works.
task other
A work is categorized as functional ... if it performs some utilitarian
333 In contrast,
than to inform, entertain, or portray an appearance to human beings.
a work is nonfunctional if its only purpose is to inform, entertain, or portray an
appearance to human beings.
Nonfunctional works are not the proper subject matter of patents. Instead, they
are the proper subject matter for copyrights. Books and maps inform. Music, dance,
and games entertain.33 Pictures portray an appearance to human beings. The
definition of "functionality" accurately places them on the copyright side of the
boundary between patents and copyrights. All of these things are copyrightable
subject matter, not patentable subject matter.
On the other hand, a process for manufacturing ethanol, a machine for
manufacturing disk brakes, and a computer keyboard all perform utilitarian tasks
other than to inform, entertain, or portray an appearance to human beings. The
definition accurately places them on the patent side of the boundary.

332. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see also, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (stating that "works
of artistic craftmanship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned" are

copyrightable)..

333. Dennis S. Kajala,A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer Software and Recent
Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L REv. 53, 59 (1997) (hereinafter Ka:jala 1997]. This definition was put
forward by Professor Kaijala in order to distinguish between patent and copyright subject matter. See also Dennis
S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Software, Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U.
DAYTON L REV. 975, 977 (1994) [hereinafter Karjala 1994]. Professor Karjala's 1994 article was originally
published under the erroneous title Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering, and
Professor Miller.
334. This suggests that patents on games and game equipment, such as that in Callison v. Dean, 70 F.2d 55
(10th. Cir. 1934), should be refused as not being patentable subject matter. Their only purpose is to entertain. In
Callison, the patent was for an amusement device that utilized a coin-controlled pistol to propel a ball to a target,
after which the ball would return by rolling down an inclined plane. See id at 56. The case held that the patent was
"useful" within the meaning of the patent statute. See id. at 58. Apparently, the issue of whether the device was
patentable subject matter was not raised. The issue of whether entertainment equipment and methods should be
patentable subject matter is discussed more extensively later in this article. See infra notes 348-65 and
accompanying text.
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Unless there is a clear congressional indication otherwise, patentable subject
matter should remain limited to the realm of functional works. That does not mean
that everything that is functional is patentable subject matter.
The boundary between functional and nonfunctional works is not perfect. 33 5 For
example, the set of instructions in the source code of a computer program can be
functional,3 36 yet Congress has placed them within the subject matter of
copyright. 37 There are good reasons for doing this, as discussed by Professor
Karjala in his excellent article.338 What is interesting is that while courts have
honored this congressional determination and have extended copyright protection
to the source code and object code of computer programs, courts have generally
refused to extend copyright protection to specific functional features of computer
programs.339 In other words, although Congress placed the instructions of computer

335. Professor Karjala, who put forth the functionality definition, admits this imperfection, but comments
on why the definition is helpful:
The functionality-nonfunctionality distinction between patent and copyright is therefore not
historically perfect. It is surely correct to say, however, that copyright has in the main eschewed
protection of function, and judicial and legislative efforts to allow copyright to control markets
for functional products have almost always been met with fierce debate. Patent and copyright
have evolved alongside one another for a period of several hundred years, and yet the protection
schemes are very different There must be some reason other than inertia that the two have
coexisted so long. Only functionality explains this dichotomy in any fundamental way.
See Karjala 1997, supra note 333, at 65 (footnote omitted).
Others have written about alternative legal regimes that might be better suited to the protection of kinds of
works that are found at the boundary between copyright and patent and about the indefiniteness of that boundary.
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy's Approach to Information Products:Muscling Copyrightand
Patentinto a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 195 (1992); J.H. Reichman, Charting
the Collapse of the Patent-CopyrightDichotomy: Premisesfor a RestructuredInternationalIntellectual Property
System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 475 (1995); J.H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer
Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 797 (1992); J.H. Reichman & Pamela
Samuelson, IntellectualPropertyRights in Data?, 50 VAND. L REV. 51 (1997); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids
between the Patentand CopyrightParadigms,94 COLUM. L REV. 2432 (1994).
336. A source code listing ofa program, on paper, only provides information to humans and is nonfunctional.
When assembled and compiled and stored in a computer, the set of instructions may provide information to
humans, but that is not its intended function and extracting the information for humans to understand is very
difficult. In this form, the instructions are used in a computer to perform various tasks. At this point, they are
functional under the definition here.
The Guidelines reach the same result in their discussion of"nonfunctional descriptive material" and "functional
descriptive material." See Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479-80 (1996).
337. A "computer program" is defined in the Copyright Act as "a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The definition
is limited to the instructions in the program and not to other features such as the user interface or the set of
functions which the program can perform. These other features may be protected by copyright or patent law, but
they do not fall within this particular definition.
338. See Karjala 1997, supra note 333. This article builds upon the ideas of one of Professor Karjala's earlier
works. See Karjala 1994, supra note 333.
339. Compare Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (1 1th Cir. 1996), Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). affdby an equallydivided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (per curiam), Gates
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993), and Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) with Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir.
1986).
In part, courts may be responding to the fact that when Congress extended protection to computer programs,
it defined computer programs as the "set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). This would serve to bring the object code and
the set of instructions in the source code into copyright, while leaving the set of functions that the program performs
outside copyright. See generally Kaijala 1997, supranote 333.
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programs inside copyright, courts have been reluctant to allow any significant
expansion of copyright subject matter beyond this limited amount. Thus, the fact
that copyrightable subject matter has expanded into the functional realm in this
instance does not undermine the general validity of the functionality/nonfunctionality dichotomy between patents and copyrights.
Courts deciding patent cases should follow the lead of the courts in copyright
cases and distinguish between the functional aspects of a work and the nonfunctional aspects.' Works that are nonfunctional, as defined here, fall on the copyright
side of the boundary between copyright and patent subject matter. Only works that
are functional can fall on the patent side of the boundary. The following sections
explore various implications of this idea.
PrintedMatter Is Usually Not PatentableSubject Matter because It Is
"Nonfunctional"
One application of the distinction between copyright subject matter and patent
subject matter is that of "printed matter."' 1 Historically, copyrights have been the
home to books, maps, charts, musical compositions, and other "printed matter."
These things are "nonfunctional." They fall into the category of copyright subject
matter. 342
"Printed matter" has generally not been considered to be patentable subject
matter. 343 Printed matter may be informative, but it is usually not "functional" in the
sense we are using that term. The fact that printed matter may be useful does not
mean that it falls within the "useful arts."
Although printed matter is generally not patentable subject matter, patentable
inventions may contain printed matter. This distinction is readily understood by
reference to the concept of "functionality." If a newly created work "performs some
utilitarian task other than to inform, entertain, or portray an appearance to human
beings," then it falls on the patentable subject matter side of the line.' One has to
N.

340. Courts have recognized that other works also have both functional and non-functional aspects, and that
the patent and copyright systems can protect different aspects of such works. See, e.g., Maser v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954) (dealing with protection for lamp bases).
341. See Samuelson, supra note 195, at 1037 n.36 (stating that "printed matter is among the set of things that
are 'writings' protectible by copyright law, not inventions in the 'useful arts"').
342. The source code of a computer program represents an exception to this general statement, as a computer
uses the instructions in the computer program to perform tasks. The computer program is functional because it is
not simply matter that provides information to humans.
343. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839 (N.D. Cal. March 10,
1998); In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668 (C.C.P.A. 1931); see generally 1 CHIsUM, supra note 7, § 1.02[4] (discussing
patentable subject matter, and stating that "[pirinted matter alone and by itself dops not constitute a 'manufacture'
and is not within the statutory classes of patentable subject matter").
In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983). is sometimes mentioned as a case in which printed matter was
allowed. The claims in Gulack were for an endless band of material with certain numbers printed on it. See i&.at
1382-83. The numbers had to be selected in a certain way to make the device into "an educational and recreational
mathematical device." See id at 1383. Although the examiner had rejected the claims under both §§ 101 and 103,
the board, for reasons not given in the appellate case, reversed the § 101 rejection, so the Federal Circuit only
Although we don't know what the Federal Circuit would
addressed the obviousness rejection under § 103. See id.
have said about the § 101 issue, it seems clear that the claims in the case are nonfunctional-they only provide
information to human beings. They fall on the copyright side of the boundary, and the claims should have been
rejected as unpatentable subject matter.
344. This does not mean that programs are always within patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Gottschalk v.
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examine an invention to determine whether it performs some utilitarian task even
though the printed matter in the invention may also provide information to us.
Computer programs represent an excellent example of printed matter that is
functional. A computer program can be read by programmers and therefore serves
to inform. The program, however, also performs other tasks when used in a
computer. 345 Therefore, computer programs are functional. 3"
As the above discussion illustrates, the concept of functionality provides a
principled way for courts to avoid extending patent protection to books and other

nonfunctional printed matter. If a work is nonfunctional, it falls on the copyright

side of the boundary and is not patentable subject matter. Books, music on CDs,
maps, charts, and other traditional copyright subject matter fall into this category

of nonfunctional works.347
0.

FurtherReflections on the Boundaries of the "Discoveries" in the "Useful
Arts:" Of EntertainmentMethods and Equipment, Accounting Systems, and
Methods of DoingBusiness
The phrase "useful arts" generally conjures up images of engineers toiling in
laboratories. We often think of the useful arts as involving "technological arts" and
contrast this area of creativity with that of copyright.' Patents regularly issue,
however, for creative works that are outside the realm of traditional electrical,
mechanical, chemical and other fields of engineering.
This subsection explores some subject matter areas which, historically, have been
considered outside the scope of patentable subject matter or which might be
considered to be outside the scope.

Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding that a program for converting binary coded decimal numerals to pure binary
numerals is not patentable subject matter).
345. See, e.g., In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cit. 1994). Lowry was an important case in which the Federal
Circuit reversed a "printed matter" rejection to the patentability of a system of organizing data in a computer
memory. See iai
at 1584. Claim one was for a computer memory which contained data stored in accordance with
the system. See id.
at 1581. Other claims included data processing systems using such a computer memory. See
id. at 1581-82. The claimed memory is "functional" because it does more than provide information to human
beings; it is an organizational structure. See id. at 1583. A user may or may not be aware of that structure, showing
that the structure, per se, is not information.
Professor Karjala argues that the computer memory is designed for processing information by a machine, and
hence that it is functional because it does more than provide information to human beings. See Karjala 1997, supra
note 296, at 60 n.21. This author respectfully disagrees with that method of analysis. Music recorded on a digital
compact disc is also designed solely for being processed by a machine, yet that is not a reason why such music
should be classified as being functional.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit relied on the same ground (that the matter was designed for processing by
a machine) in holding that the claim was not "rinted matter." See Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582. The example of a digital
music recording shows that this analytical approach fails.
346. Professor Weinreb writes:
However we may have regarded programs two decades ago, it is apparent now that they are
valuable for the work that they do and not for what they by themselves communicate to us. To
prefer the "bookish" aspects of a program to its functional nature is surely to elevate the
incidental over the essential.
Weinreb, supra note 308, at 1250.
347. A literalist might try to call these works patentable subject matter on the grounds
they are
"manufactures." We have already seen that such a literal reading of § 101 is untenable. See supra notesthat
187-96 and
accompanying text.
348. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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One such area is that of "business methods." A number of courts have,
sometimes in dictum, indicated that business systems are not patentable subject
matter, suggesting that such systems are not within the "useful arts." ' However,
a recent district court decision which used the business methods doctrine to
invalidate patent claims was reversed on appeal.3 °
In its State Street decision, the Federal Circuit expressly repudiated the "business
method" doctrine.35 The court stated that "[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, business
methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements
for patentability as applied to any other process or method. 352
Unfortunately, this reasoning is lacking. It acts as if the words of § 101 were
meant literally, rather than as terms of art. As this article has already shown, such
a literal reading of the word "process" in § 101 is impermissible.353 One has to dig
deeper into the meaning of the words "machine" and "process" in § 101 before
deciding whether business methods should not be patentable subject matter.
This raises the question of whether there is any constitutional basis for thinking
that business methods are not the kind of "discoveries" within the "useful arts" that
Congress can protect under the patent system.
Another category of creativity is that of the entertainment industry. Are new golf
clubs, new methods of doing slam dunks, new video arcade equipment, new
gambling procedures, or new techniques for doing computer animation for use in
motion pictures patentable subject matter? That they involve creativity is beyond
question. That they can fall within the literal terms of the classes of patentable
subject matter in § 101 is also apparent. That they are "useful" in the broadest sense
of that word is also the case. But these truths do not answer the question of whether
they meet the constitutional test of being "discoveries" within the "useful arts."

349. See, e.g., Exparte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) (rejecting a claim
for an accounting method as unpatentable subject matter on the grounds that it was a method of doing business);
Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine, 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) ("A system of transacting business
disconnected from the means for carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation of the term,
an art."). But see State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature F'm. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

(repudiating the business methods exception); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D.Del. 1983) (finding that a claim for a system of combining three kinds
of customer accounts (a charge card account, a money market account, and a brokerage account) was patentable
subject matter).
Some have pointed out that the cases do not articulate a principled basis for the business methods doctrine, or
that the doctrine is unworkable in practice. See, e.g., Rinaldo Del Gallo, Ill, Are "Methods of Doing Business"
Finally Out of Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403 (1998); Chiappetta, supra note 11, at 131.

350. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fr. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
351. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.

352. Id. The decision also notes that the PTO seems to have abandoned use of this ground for rejecting
patents. Former sections of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures contained § 706.03(a) which said that
"[though seemingly within the category of process or method, a method of doing business can be rejected as not
being within the statutory classes." See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1397. This section has now been deleted. See id.
The recent Guidelines indicate the new position of the PTO: "Office personnel have had difficulty in properly
treating claims directed to methods of doing business. Claims should not be categorized as methods of doing
business. Instead, such claims should be treated like any other process claims, pursuant to these Guidelines when
relevant." Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479-80 (1996).
353. See supranotes 187-96 and accompanying text.
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We have seen that although the categories of patentable subject matter-the
"useful arts"-can be expanded to include new technologies," these classes are not
infinitely malleable. For example, the "useful arts" does not include new books,
music, or other subject matter that traditionally has fallen within the subject matter
of copyright.
The evidence for what the drafters of the Constitution had in mind by the term
"useful arts" is meager. We only have a limited indication of what the first patent
applications covered.355 More generally, President George Washington, in
addressing Congress on January 8, 1790, spoke of the need for a patent act in order
' Both
to advance "agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing."356
houses of Congress
357
concurred.
The term "useful arts," however, should not be limited to the areas of technology
that were known in the late eighteenth century. Indeed, one of the major benefits of
the patent system is to encourage the development of new technological areas.
One possible argument is that the categories of patentable subject matter should
not expand to include categories that were in existence at the time of the Constitution but were not included as patentable subject matter at that time.35 If it is
accurate to say that business methods, accounting systems, and entertainment
equipment and processes existed but were not contemplated as being within the
"useful arts" at that time,359 then that might be an appropriate ground for excluding
them from being patentable subject matter.
A look at the analogous question in copyright law suggests that this argument
may not succeed. The constitutional mandate of copyright is to "promote the
Progress of Science."" The word "Science" in the Constitution does not have its
present meanings for fields such as biology, chemistry, and physics. Instead, in the
Constitution, "Science" means learning and knowledge.36 1

354. See supra Part VI.D.-E.
355. See supra text accompanying note 243.
356. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
358. A secondary reason for excluding these kinds of creativity might be found on policy grounds. An
underlying policy of the patent system is that it is designed to encourage investments in research and development
which might not otherwise be made. It would be most interesting to know whether such an incentive is needed to
encourage the development of new business methods or new entertainment equipment and methods.
On purely intuitive grounds, it would seem likely that new business systems typically do not require the
incentives offered by the patent system nor do they typically require large amounts of money in research and
development. Consider the first idea for franchise systems, for drive-in movies, for the combination of a securities
brokerage/cash management system, for systems to prevent fraud by employees of restaurants, or for a checking

account with an attached line of credit. One might well believe that new business methods such as these are likely
to arise quite naturally in the course of a competitive economy as businesses attempt to thrive. If this is the case,
then extending patent protection to new business methods would do more to hamper a free economy than to
promote innovation.
Similarly, one would wonder whether incentives are needed to encourage people to develop new methods of
holding golf clubs or dunking basketballs, to create new golf clubs, or to develop new gambling systems.
359. Of course, it may be quite difficult to determine whether the drafters of the Constitution included these
kinds of subject matter within the term "useful arts."
360. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
361. See Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830 F. Supp. 614,621 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1993); American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco. Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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The first copyright statute authorized copyrights for books, maps, and charts, thus
establishing a fairly narrow range of copyrightable subject matter. 362 Today,
copyright subject matter has expanded enormously, including areas such as
choreography, sculpture, music, advertisements, computer programs, and
architecture. At least some of these areas (sculpture, music, advertisements and
architecture) existed in the late eighteenth century, and one might harbor some
doubts as to whether the authors of the Constitution would have thought that all of
these subject matter areas would advance learning and knowledge. Yet, the Supreme
Court has held that advertisements are within the scope of permissible copyrightable
subject matter,363 suggesting that something that existed, but was outside the scope
of the term "writings" at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, could later be
made part of copyrightable subject matter.
Even if the argument fails that the categories of patentable subject matter can
expand to include subject matter that was not included at the time the Constitution
was written, that does not mean that the concepts of "discoveries" and "useful arts"
can or should be expanded to include inventions which are business methods,
accounting systems, entertainment methods, or entertainment equipment. It may
simply mean that it is difficult to articulate the reason why a given kind of subject
matter should be excluded.
A second reason for limiting the scope of patentable subject matter is at once
more nebulous and more compelling. Our common understanding of what is
patentable suggests these limits. Concededly, this is similar to the "I know it when
I see it" approach, but is grounded on the slightly firmer basis of a societal
understanding. Professor Weinreb, in analyzing whether certain facets of computer
programs can and should be protected as copyrightable subject matter, argues that
copyright theories are unable to help us define the boundaries of copyrightable
matter and that we are left with, and must ultimately rely upon, our conventional
understanding that copyrights deal with book-like things. 364 This same argument
would seem to apply equally to the question of the boundaries of patentable subject
matter. Our conventional understanding of patents is that they apply to machines
and machine-like processes and things. Our failure to find a theory that justifies this
understanding does not mean that the understanding is incorrect. It may be that the
understanding should be treated as correct unless we can find a theory that indicates
a need to change that understanding.
This article has argued that the Constitution provides the limits of patentable
subject matter, but the possibility that the Constitution may be indeterminate should
not be ignored. If it is indeterminate, then we should rely upon our conventional
understanding of what kinds of things must be patentable. In this context, the
repeated comments made by courts, commentators, and the PTO over the years to
the effect that business methods are not patentable subject matter should be taken
as strong evidence that business systems are perceived to be far outside the bounds
362. See supra note 248.
363. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
364. See Weinreb, supra note 308, at 1153. By "conventional," Professor Weinreb "mean[s] only that what
is so described is generally unquestioned, not because the evidence or arguments for it are especially convincing,
but simply because it is and has been accepted." Id. at 1153 n.7.
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' Similarly, the fact that patents have virtually never been
of the "useful arts."365
sought for accounting systems and sports moves suggests that these should also be
treated as far outside the scope of patentable subject matter. Sports and entertainment equipment, on the other hand, have been accepted as patentable subject matter
for a long time and a deference to this conventional view is equally appropriate.

P. Purely Mental ProcessesAre Not PatentableSubject Matter
Although this article has discussed constitutional limits on patentable subject
matter based on the Patent Clause of the Constitution, it is appropriate to consider
other constitutional provisions. Another constraint on patentable subject matter is
the First Amendment. Although written to prohibit governmental interference with
freedom of speech, the First Amendment also prevents the government from
interfering with freedom of thought.3" Thus, a patent that purports to cover a
process that can be done mentally should be prohibited.36 7
For example, a claimed patent on a process for improving gymnastics performances by mentally visualizing the entire routine prior to performing it should be
barred from patentable subject matter on First Amendment grounds.36 Similarly,
a patent for a process of mathematical calculations should be prohibited unless it
is confined to cover only machine-implemented versions of the method.369
On the other hand, the patent system should encourage innovations that replace
human labor, including mental labor, with machines. Thus, a patent for a process
done by machines should generally be patentable subject matter even though the
same process was formerly done mentally.3 70
If In re Musgrave37 suggested that the mental steps doctrine is inapplicable to
the issue of patentable subject matter, this author respectfully disagrees. In
Musgrave, the court discussed a claim for a process intended to be implemented
entirely by machine, but which process, in theory,372 might have been done by

365. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 195, at 1036 n.34 (commenting that the lack of explanation for the mental
steps doctrine "may be a sign of how far outside the bounds of the patent system mental processes are perceived
to be"). Until recently, the PTO rejected claims drawn to business methods. See supra note 352.
366. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,714(1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-327 (1937); cf In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1400 n.20 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
(discussing the PTO's argument that "'a patent containing process claims of such breadth as to confer upon a
patentee the right to exclude others from thinking in a certain manner' would run afoul of the First, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments to the Constitution").
367. See, e.g., Exparte Hitchins, 99 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288, 292 (Bd. Pat. App. 1953).
368. In addition, such a claim could probably be rejected on grounds of vagueness or indefiniteness, as it may
rely on subjective or emotional responses of people. These responses would vary from person to person. See, e.g.,
Katherine P. Ambrose, Comment, The Mental Steps Doctrine, TENN. L REV. 903 (1981); Norman D. McClaskey,
The Mental ProcessDoctrine: Its Origin, Legal Basis, and Scope, IOWA L REV. 1148 (1970).
The indefiniteness and vagueness grounds would not apply to a claim which involved definite, objective steps.
The First Amendment objection to such a claim, however, would remain valid.
369. Cf In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding invalid a patent claim for a process said to be
limited to machine implementation, but not expressly made so, because of failure to particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as applicant's invention).
370. This general statement is subject to exceptions for certain mathematical calculations and other
nonfunctional processes. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
371. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
372. In the real-world, it is unlikely that the claims could have been done by mental steps aided by pencil and
paper.
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mental steps. 7 3 The court seems to dismiss the mental steps doctrine by writing,
"All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a
statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so
as to be in consonance
with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of
'useful arts. ' ' 374 If the court was suggesting that the First Amendment can be
ignored in determining patentable subject matter, the court has gone farther than is
warranted. 7 5
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has issued three decisions concerning mathematical
algorithm-related inventions and computer-related inventions and those decisions
have failed to provide appropriate guidance to lower courts. The Federal Circuit
(and earlier, the C.C.P.A.) tried to understand and follow those cases, but has been
unable to do so in a consistent and principled manner. They have developed the
Freeman-Walter-Abeletest and the Claims-as-a-Whole test, but different panels of
the Federal Circuit apply these tests in different ways, so that no one knows what
the result will be in any particular case until a particular panel of judges makes a
decision.
A major problem with the analysis being used by some panels of the Federal
Circuit is that they read the words of § 101 of the Patent Act literally. Instead, the
words in § 101 are terms of art and must be construed in a manner that is consistent
with the Constitution.
This article goes beyond the current debates and analyses and puts forth an
analysis of patentable matter that is grounded in the Constitution. It notes that there
are at least four constitutionally-based requirements for patentability. One is that a
new creative work must involve "invention," a constitutional requirement that is
now partially codified by the non-obviousness requirement of the Patent Act.
The second constitutional requirement is that there must be a proper quid pro quo
of public benefit in order for a patent to issue. This requirement, codified in part in
the novelty requirements of the Patent Act, bars patents that would remove
something from the public domain. This constitutionally-required quid pro quo
might also account for the Supreme Court's decisions that one cannot claim so
broadly that the private benefit of a patent monopoly would far exceed the public
benefit from the particular invention made.
The third constitutional requirement is that a work must involve a useful
application of knowledge. In part, this constitutional requirement has been codified
as the requirement that a new invention has to be "useful" in order to be patentable.
The fourth constitutional requirement is that a new invention must be a
"discovery" within the "useful arts"--that it be the proper kind of work to be

373. See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 885-88.
374. See id. at 893.
375. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195-201 (1981), comments on the

mental steps doctrine and one has the impression that he was troubled by the most recent C.C.P.A. decisions which
seemingly rejected this doctrine. Professor Samuelson, commenting on the lack of doctrinal basis for the mental
steps doctrine, notes that "this lack of explanation instead may be a sign of how far outside the bounds of the patent
system mental processes are perceived to be." Samuelson, supra note 195, at 1036 n.34.
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subject to a patent. Historically, books, maps, and musical works have been
excluded from the subject matter of patents and the Supreme Court has identified
other kinds of discoveries that are not subject to patentability, such as laws of
nature, natural phenomena, abstract ideas, and mathematical algorithms.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether such nontechnologically-oriented areas as business systems, accounting methods, and
entertainment equipment and methods are the proper kind of "discoveries" to fall
within the "useful arts." This article discussed some possible arguments for why
they might be excluded from being patentable subject matter.
In addition to the constitutional constraints posed by the Patent Clause of the
Constitution, the article also noted that the First Amendment imposes additional
constraints-in particular, that purely mental processes are not patentable subject
matter.
The most difficult determination is which mathematical algorithm-related
inventions are patentable subject matter. As this is a constitutional issue, it is up to
the Supreme Court to resolve it. The Court, in deciding Flook and the related cases
involving mathematical algorithms, sent confusing signals about where the line
should be drawn between those mathematical algorithm-related inventions that are
patentable subject matter and those that are not. This article suggests that Flook
probably indicates that any patent claim is not patentable subject matter where the
claim amounts to the use of a mathematical algorithm or formula in order to
calculate a number or numbers.
Notwithstanding that interpretation of Flook, this article urges the Court to adopt
a different test--one which holds that claims involving mathematical calculations
will generally be treated as patentable subject matter if those numbers are part of
technological processes and represent real-world phenomena. This test comports
better with the other subject matter restrictions and would acknowledge that the
application of mathematical calculations in computers is an important arena for
patents within the "useful arts."

